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# The Blackletter on California Workers’ Compensation

*2026 Edition · Corpus 4 — every rule in the corpus, in the courts’ own words; nothing more, nothing less, nothing of ours.*

Compiled under the direction of Sean Richard Weber · Nathan Howser, Esq., contributing author and editor · named in memory of Richard Weber (1943–1999). Cite: *Blackletter* § N.N, p. N (2026). Free to read; training-closed; machine-verified — [verification](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/api/verification) · [census ledger](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/api/census) · [the web book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/).

## The Corpus

- *Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc.* (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (Appeals Board en banc) — [slip opinion](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc) · [case page](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/case/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc)
- *DiFusco v. Hands On Spa* (2025) ADJ7445107, 90 Cal.Comp.Cases 1007 (Appeals Board en banc) — [slip opinion](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc) · [case page](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/case/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc)
- *Perez v. Chicago Dogs* (2025) ADJ16597333 (Appeals Board en banc) — [slip opinion](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc) · [case page](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/case/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc)
- *Vazquez v. Renteria* (2025) ADJ11017003, 90 Cal.Comp.Cases 514 (Appeals Board en banc) — [slip opinion](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc) · [case page](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/case/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc)

---

## Chapter 1 · The System

### § 1.1  The Weight of En Banc Decisions

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 1.1, p. 1 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-1-1)

> “En banc decisions of the Appeals Board are binding precedent on all Appeals
> Board panels and workers’ compensation administrative law judges.”
> — (Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (Appeals Bd. en
banc), fn. 1, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10325; City of Long Beach v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 316, fn. 5; Gee v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1424, fn. 6, [at p. 1](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=1).)

> “This en banc decision is also adopted as a precedent decision pursuant to
> Government Code section 11425.60(b).”
> — (Gaines, supra, fn. 1, [at p. 1](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=1).)

> “En banc decisions of the Appeals Board are binding precedent on all Appeals Board panels and workers’ compensation administrative judges.”
> — (DiFusco v. Hands On Spa (2025) ADJ7445107 (Appeals Bd. en banc), fn. 2 [“administrative judges” so in original], citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10325; City of Long Beach v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 316, fn. 5; Gee v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1424, fn. 6; accord Gaines, supra, fn. 1; Perez v. Chicago Dogs (2025) ADJ16597333 (Appeals Bd. en banc), fn. 1; Vazquez v. Renteria (2025) ADJ11017003 (Appeals Bd. en banc), fn. 2 [citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10305(k), 10325(a)], [at p. 1](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=1).)

> “Sections 111 and 115 grant statutory authority to the Appeals Board to issue en banc decisions.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “Government Code section 11425.60(b) provides additional authority for the WCAB to designate all or part of a decision “that contains a signification legal or policy determination of general application that is likely to recur” as a “precedent decision,” and our en banc decisions are routinely adopted as precedent decisions.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 6 [so in original], [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “Upon a unanimous vote of its members, the Appeals Board issues this decision as an en banc decision.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 115, [at p. 1](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=1).)

> “Unlike en banc decisions, panel decisions are not binding precedent on other Appeals Board panels and WCJs.”
> — (Vazquez v. Renteria (2025) ADJ11017003 (Appeals Bd. en banc), fn. 5, citing Gee, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425, fn. 6, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

> “However, panel decisions are citeable authority and the Appeals Board may consider these decisions to the extent that their reasoning is found persuasive, particularly on issues of contemporaneous administrative construction of statutory language.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, fn. 5, citing Guitron v. Santa Fe Extruders (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 228, fn. 7 (Appeals Bd. en banc); Griffith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1264, fn. 2, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

> “We recommend that practitioners proceed with caution when citing to a panel decision and verify its subsequent history.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, fn. 5, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

*Cross-references: §§ 1.2–1.3, 16.2, 17.1, 19.1–19.6, 20.1–20.2, 21.8–21.10, 22.1, 24.6, 26.1, 26.6 (the corpus’s en banc rules). Remainder of chapter: reserved.*


### § 1.2  En Banc Precedent: Stare Decisis; No Supersession by Regulation

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 1.2, p. 2 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-1-2)

> “Appeals Board en banc decisions have the same legal effect as published appellate opinions.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Signature Fruit Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Ochoa) (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 790, 796, fn. 2, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “[E]n banc decisions “are binding on panels of the Appeals Board and workers’ compensation judges as legal precedent under the principle of stare decisis.””
> — (DiFusco, supra, quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10325, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “The principle of stare decisis means that precedent-setting court opinions may only be overruled by the same court, or a higher court. Hence, an Appeals Board en banc opinion must be followed by panels of the Appeals Board and by all WCJs until rescinded, altered, or overruled by the Appeals Board en banc, overruled by a Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court pursuant to sections 5950 through 5956, or rendered inapplicable by a legislative enactment.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “[E]n banc opinions of the Appeals Board are not repealed “by implication” and thus, an en banc opinion cannot be “superseded” by the enactment of a regulation.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “There is simply no valid legal authority for the contention that by enacting a rule, we have superseded one of our en banc decisions by operation of law.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “[W]e emphasize that if changes are made to an existing rule, we must follow the procedures of the rulemaking process.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “[W]CJs and all parties before the Appeals Board must follow the plain language of the regulations as written, and, at the same time, abide by our en banc decisions. Unless otherwise stated, it is presumed that the Appeals Board is aware of the statutory and decisional law, including its own en bancs, when it enacts regulations, and the appropriate time to raise concerns about a particular rule and its impact, whether intended or unintended, is when the Appeals Board is engaged in rule making.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 10, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “[A]n en banc opinion issued by the Appeals Board is binding legal precedent, unaffected by the regulatory process, and continues to be binding legal precedent unless the Appeals Board explicitly rescinds it en banc, it is overruled by a higher Court, or it is rendered no longer applicable by legislative changes.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> **HOLDING No. 1 · DIFUSCO (2025) · EN BANC · BINDING** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “All en banc decisions are binding on panels of the Appeals Board and WCJs, and the binding en banc decisions in Coldiron I and Coldiron II require disclosure of any entities liable for payment and any insurance policies that impact liability for payment.”

> “The California Supreme Court explained in People v. Bouzas that in interpreting legislation, “repeal by implication is disfavored...””
> — (DiFusco, supra, quoting People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

*Cross-references: § 1.1 (weight of en banc decisions); § 16.2 (the Coldiron disclosures); § 17.1 (discovery); § 22.1 (policy provisions affecting liability).*


### § 1.3  The Appeals Board as Court; Rulemaking Authority and Its Limits

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 1.3, p. 4 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-1-3)

> “The Appeals Board is a constitutional court vested with judicial powers.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 111(a), 52, 5300, 5301, 5302; McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348, 355–356; Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Merzoian) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 89, 97, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “For over 100 years, it has been repeatedly held that the Appeals Board (and its predecessor, the Industrial Accident Commission), exercises a portion of the judicial powers of the State of California and is, in legal effect, a court.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Merzoian) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 89, 97; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (Mason) (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 411–412; Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Baskin) (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 54, 58–59, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “Thus, the Appeals Board must follow a statute in the Labor Code as written and enacted by the Legislature, unless or until the Legislature changes a statute or a higher court issues an opinion as to its application.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “In comparison, regulations are enacted by state agencies under statutory authority granted by an enabling statute, to implement and enforce a statute, after public notice and an opportunity for public comment.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 568; Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “Section 5708 authorizes the Appeals Board to promulgate regulations regarding the adjudicatory process, and section 5307 describes the mandatory procedures for adopting, amending or rescinding regulations, including the requirement for a public hearing.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5307, 5708, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “The WCAB falls within a statutory exclusion because its adjudicative proceedings are expressly governed by the Labor Code and by its own rules of practice and procedures and because it is not bound by any other statutory rules of procedure.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 8, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5708, 5307, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “While the WCAB is empowered to enact rules or procedures under the proper circumstances, it may not change legislation that is within the plenary power of the Legislature under article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution.”
> — (Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Milbauer) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 644, as quoted in DiFusco, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “(a) The appeals board shall establish uniform district office procedures, uniform forms, and uniform time of court settings for all district offices of the appeals board. No district office of the appeals board or workers’ compensation administrative law judge shall require forms or procedures other than as established by the appeals board. A workers’ compensation administrative law judge who violates this section may be subject to disciplinary proceedings. (b) The appeals board shall establish uniform court procedures and uniform forms for all other proceedings of the appeals board.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5500.3, as quoted in DiFusco, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “While a regulation enacted by the Appeals Board may become invalid when an appellate court determines that it contradicts a statute, if the Appeals Board determines that a regulation is no longer valid or is no longer applicable as written, the Appeals Board must follow the same procedures used to enact the regulation, including the public hearing requirement, prior to the amendment or repeal of the regulation.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5307; Milbauer, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 625, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> **HOLDING No. 2 · DIFUSCO (2025) · EN BANC · BINDING** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “Only the Appeals Board is statutorily authorized to issue regulations for adjudication for workers’ compensation proceedings, and WCAB Rules 10390, 10400 and 10401 require that parties, their representatives, and their insurance companies be fully identified.”

> “The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) applies to all state “agencies” (see Gov. Code, § 11500), except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 8, citing Gov. Code, §§ 11410.20(a), 11415.10(a), [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “The Appeals Board has a constitutional mandate to “ensure substantial justice in all cases.””
> — (Kuykendall, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 403, as quoted in Perez v. Chicago Dogs (2025) ADJ16597333 (Appeals Bd. en banc), [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “Only the Appeals Board has statutory authority to establish procedures in workers’ compensation proceedings and to promulgate rules.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 6](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=6).)

> “In addition to this statutory authority granted only to the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board has statutory authority under sections 5307 and 5708 to promulgate regulations regarding the adjudicatory process.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5307, 5708, [at p. 6](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=6).)

> “The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workers’ compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of their workers for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workers in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party … * * * The Legislature is vested with plenary powers, to provide for the settlement of any disputes arising under such legislation by arbitration, or by an industrial accident commission, by the courts, or by either, any, or all of these agencies, either separately or in combination, and may fix and control the method and manner of trial of any such dispute, the rules of evidence and the manner of review of decisions rendered by the tribunal or tribunals designated by it; provided, that all decisions of any such tribunal shall be subject to review by the appellate courts of this State. … * * * Nothing contained herein shall be taken or construed to impair or render ineffectual in any measure the creation and existence of the industrial accident commission of this State or the state compensation insurance fund, the creation and existence of which, with all the functions vested in them, are hereby ratified and confirmed.”
> — (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4, as quoted in Dennis v. State of California (2020) 85 Cal.Comp.Cases 389, 396 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “Under this constitutional grant of plenary power to the Legislature, the California Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) was enacted “to establish a complete and exclusive system of workers’ compensation including ‘full provision for vesting power, authority and jurisdiction in an administrative body with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any dispute or matter arising under such legislation, to the end that the administration of such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character; all of which matters are expressly declared to be the social public policy of this State … .’””
> — (Dennis, supra, 85 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 396 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “Thus, under the grant of authority in the California Constitution, the Appeals Board operates as an appellate court of limited jurisdiction that reviews and decides appeals from decisions issued by workers’ compensation administrative law judges.”
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “The Workers’ Compensation Act is found in Divisions 4 and 4.5 of the Labor Code, as administered and enforced by the Division of Workers’ Compensation under the control of the Administrative Director, “except as to those duties, powers, jurisdiction, responsibilities, and purposes as are specifically vested in” the Appeals Board.”
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, quoting Lab. Code, § 111, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “The Appeals Board exercises all judicial powers vested in it by the Labor Code and may do all things necessary or convenient in the exercise of any power or jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Labor Code.”
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 111, 133, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “the major function of the Appeals Board is regulation of the adjudication process by adopting rules of practice and procedure and issuing en banc opinions”
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5307, 115, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “The Administrative Director “exercise[s] the powers of the head of a department … [including] supervision of, and responsibility for, personnel, and the coordination of the work of the division. …””
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, quoting Lab. Code, § 111; see Lab. Code, §§ 123, 127, 133, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

*Cross-references: § 1.2 (en banc precedent); § 16.2 (identification requirements in practice).*


### § 1.4  Statutory Construction; Prospective Application of New Interpretations

*● settled · en banc; Supreme Court as quoted · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 1.4, p. 8 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-1-4)

> “Statutory analysis begins by examining “the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent … The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.””
> — (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818, quoting Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715–716, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “When the words of a statute are clear, we must follow their plain meaning.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 263, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “The Appeals Board has long held that new interpretations of statute are applied prospectively.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “In workers’ compensation cases, it is not uncommon to provide that newly stated judicial rules or newly stated judicial interpretations of statutes shall be applied prospectively only. Such a declaration of prospective application is made primarily to prevent a landslide of reopenings in previously adjudicated workers’ compensation cases, which would burden the workers’ compensation system and result in unfairness to those parties who had relied on a different understanding of law or had accepted a different application of the law; a declaration of prospective application may also be made to harmonize statutory provisions. (Citations.) Although decisions regarding procedural issues are more commonly given prospective effect than are decisions regarding substantive issues (Citation.), decisions affecting an applicant’s substantive right to receive or a defendant’s substantive duty to pay workers’ compensation benefits will be applied prospectively under appropriate circumstances.”
> — (Farris v. Industrial Wire Products (2000) 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 824, 832–833 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “In Farris, we concluded that our decision in that case, on the application of section 5814 penalties to unreasonably delayed section 4650(d) penalties, should be applied prospectively to avoid “an undue burden on the administration of justice in the workers’ compensation system” and the “overwhelming adverse effect on the workers’ compensation system and on the reasonable expectations of the parties participating in it.” (Citation.)”
> — (Messele v. Pitco Foods, Inc. (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 1318, 1320–1321 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

*Cross-references: § 1.2 (stare decisis); § 9.6 (prospective holdings applied); § 21.2 (the amended § 5909 construed).*


## Chapter 2 · Jurisdiction & Coverage

### § 2.1  Exclusive Jurisdiction of the WCAB

*● settled · en banc as quoted · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 2.1, p. 10 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-2-1)

> “Pursuant to section 5300, the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the “recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto” of injuries that “arise out of and in the course” of employment.”
> — (Dennis, supra, 85 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 396 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “In other words, the WCAB maintains exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the California Constitution and section 5300 to adjudicate workers’ compensation disputes.”
> — (Dennis, supra, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

*Cross-references: § 1.3 (the Board as court); § 19.2 (jurisdiction to approve settlements). Remainder of chapter: reserved.*


## Chapter 9 · The Medical-Legal Process

### § 9.6  Replacement of a QME: Jurisdiction, Statutory Rights, and the Good-Cause Factors

*● settled · en banc; statutes and regulations as quoted; holdings prospective · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 9.6, p. 11 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-9-6)

> **HOLDING No. 1 · VAZQUEZ (2025) · EN BANC · BINDING · PROSPECTIVE** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “Only the Appeals Board has jurisdiction to determine whether a replacement panel is valid or otherwise appropriate.”

> “Accordingly, the Appeals Board is vested with the judicial power to adjudicate workers’ compensation cases, which includes the determination of whether a replacement QME panel is valid or otherwise appropriate.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 111, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “The Appeals Board has broad powers to adjudicate discovery disputes, which include the taking of additional medical evidence.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing McDuffie v. L.A. County Metro. Transit Auth. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138, 141 (Appeals Bd. en banc); Lab. Code, §§ 5701, 5906; Tyler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 389, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Two provisions in the Labor Code expressly grant parties the statutory right to replace a QME.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “In other words, when a violation described in the statute occurs, a party may promptly seek replacement of the QME.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “(f) Communications with an agreed medical evaluator shall be in writing, and shall be served on the opposing party when sent to the agreed medical evaluator. Oral or written communications with physician staff or, as applicable, with the agreed medical evaluator, relative to nonsubstantial matters such as the scheduling of appointments, missed appointments, the furnishing of records and reports, and the availability of the report, do not constitute ex parte communication in violation of this section unless the appeals board has made a specific finding of an impermissible ex parte communication. (g) Ex parte communication with an agreed medical evaluator or a qualified medical evaluator selected from a panel is prohibited. If a party communicates with the agreed medical evaluator or the qualified medical evaluator in violation of subdivision (e), the aggrieved party may elect to terminate the medical evaluation and seek a new evaluation from another qualified medical evaluator to be selected according to Section 4062.1 or 4062.2, as applicable, or proceed with the initial evaluation.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 4062.3(f), (g), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, fn. 7; see Alvarez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 575; Suon v. California Dairies (2018) 83 Cal.Comp.Cases 1803 (Appeals Bd. en banc); Maxham v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2017) 82 Cal.Comp.Cases 136 (Appeals Bd. en banc), [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘ex parte’ as, ‘On or from one party only, usually without notice to or argument from the adverse party.’ (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 597, col. 2.) Black’s further states that an ‘ex parte communication’ is, ‘A generally prohibited communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present.’”
> — (Maxham, supra, 82 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 142 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, fn. 8, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “The second is a failure to timely complete a formal medical evaluation under sections 4062.5 and 139.2(j)(1).”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “If a qualified medical evaluator selected from a panel fails to complete the formal medical evaluation within the timeframes established by the administrative director pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (j) of Section 139.2, a new evaluation may be obtained upon the request of either party, as provided in Sections 4062.1 or 4062.2. Neither the employee nor the employer shall have any liability for payment for the formal medical evaluation which was not completed within the required timeframes unless the employee or employer, on forms prescribed by the administrative director, each waive the right to a new evaluation and elects to accept the original evaluation even though it was not completed within the required timeframes.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 4062.5, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “(j) After public hearing pursuant to Section 5307.3, the administrative director shall adopt regulations concerning the following issues: (1) (A) Standards governing the timeframes within which medical evaluations shall be prepared and submitted by agreed and qualified medical evaluators. Except as provided in this subdivision, the timeframe for initial medical evaluations to be prepared and submitted shall be no more than 30 days after the evaluator has seen the employee or otherwise commenced the medical evaluation procedure. The administrative director shall develop regulations governing the provision of extensions of the 30-day period in both of the following cases: (i) When the evaluator has not received test results or consulting physician’s evaluations in time to meet the 30-day deadline. (ii) To extend the 30-day period by not more than 15 days when the failure to meet the 30-day deadline was for good cause. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), “good cause” means any of the following: (i) Medical emergencies of the evaluator or evaluator’s family. (ii) Death in the evaluator’s family. (iii) Natural disasters or other community catastrophes that interrupt the operation of the evaluator’s business. (C) The administrative director shall develop timeframes governing availability of qualified medical evaluators for unrepresented employees under Section 4062.1. These timeframes shall give the employee the right to the addition of a new evaluator to his or her panel, selected at random, for each evaluator not available to see the employee within a specified period of time, but shall also permit the employee to waive this right for a specified period of time thereafter.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 139.2(j)(1), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “Based on a plain reading of section 139.2(j)(1), we conclude that the term “medical evaluation” does not refer to the scheduling or availability of the QME to set an appointment.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “Harmonizing sections 4062.5 and 139.2(j)(1), we conclude that the term ‘formal medical evaluation’ contained in section 4062.5 actually refers to the report generated after an in-person evaluation. Thus, a party may seek to replace a QME under section 4062.5 where an evaluation takes place and the report prepared from that evaluation is untimely served.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “[W]hen sections 4062.5 and 139.2(j)(1) are read together, a party’s statutory right to seek replacement of a QME in represented cases arises when the QME fails to timely issue a report following a medical evaluation.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “In represented cases, the determination of whether a QME should be replaced due to unavailability to set an evaluation is within the discretionary power of the Appeals Board, and a QME may be replaced where a party demonstrates good cause for the replacement.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “(e) If a party with the legal right to schedule an appointment with a QME is unable to obtain an appointment with a selected QME within ninety (90) days of the date of the appointment request, that party may waive the right to a replacement in order to accept an appointment no more than one-hundred-twenty (120) days after the date of the party’s initial request for an appointment. When the selected QME is unable to schedule the evaluation within one-hundred-twenty (120) days of the date of that party’s initial request for an appointment, either party may report the unavailability of the QME and the Medical Director shall issue a replacement pursuant to section 31.5 of Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations upon request, unless both parties agree in writing to waive the one-hundred-twenty (120) day time limit for scheduling the initial or any subsequent evaluation.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 31.3(e), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “(f) The provisions of subdivision (e) of this regulation apply to both requests for any Comprehensive Medical-Legal Evaluation by a QME and requests for Follow Up Comprehensive Medical-Legal Evaluations by a QME.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 31.3(f), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “AD Rule 31.5 merely compels the Medical Director to issue a replacement panel upon request of a party when any of the enumerated conditions in subdivision (a)(2) occur.”
> — (Vazquez, supra; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 31.5(a)(2), [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “Thus, while the rules are valid, AD Rules 31.3 and 31.5 cannot be interpreted as finally determining whether a replacement panel is appropriate because such an interpretation would usurp the adjudicative power of the Appeals Board to determine whether a QME should be replaced.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 111, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “In a represented case, the Labor Code expressly allows replacement of a QME who drafts an untimely report following a medical evaluation; however, it does not compel replacement of a QME who is not timely available to set an appointment. Absent a statute compelling such a result, whether a QME should be replaced due to unavailability falls within the Appeals Board’s broad equitable powers.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 111, 52, 5300–5302; McHugh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 355–356, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “[T]he Industrial Accident Commission of this state has been invested with the power and authority to hear and determine equitable issues.”
> — (Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Merzoian) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 89, 98, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “The administrative director shall establish agreements with qualified medical evaluators to ensure the expeditious evaluation of cases assigned to them for comprehensive medical evaluations.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 139.2(g), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “Accordingly, where a QME is unavailable pursuant to regulation, they may subject themselves to discipline, which could ultimately lead to the loss of the QME’s appointment.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 60, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “While the dates set by the Administrative Director are important and should be followed and may even be persuasive as to whether the length of delay is inappropriate, we cannot find on this record that the mere passing of time is sufficient to warrant replacing the existing QME.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

> “Instead, we adapt the factors set forth in the panel decision in Corrado, supra.”
> — (Vazquez, supra; see Corrado v. Aquafine Corp. (June 24, 2016, ADJ9150447, ADJ9150446) [2016 Cal.Wrk.Comp. P.D. LEXIS 318] (panel), [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> **HOLDING No. 2 · VAZQUEZ (2025) · EN BANC · BINDING · PROSPECTIVE** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “In a represented case, where a QME does not timely establish availability to set an appointment pursuant to AD Rule 31.3, a WCJ or the Appeals Board has discretion to order a replacement QME for good cause. The WCJ or the Appeals Board may consider the following: a. The length of delay caused by the QME’s unavailability. b. The amount of prejudice caused by the delay in availability versus the amount of prejudice caused by restarting the QME process. c. What efforts, if any, have been made to remedy the QME’s availability. d. Case specific factual reasons that justify replacing or keeping the current QME, including whether a party may have waived its objection. e. The Appeals Board’s constitutional mandate to “accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.)”

> “In Messele, the Appeals Board found that the 10-day period to request an evaluator is extended by five days by application of law.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, describing Messele, supra, 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 1318 (Appeals Bd. en banc), [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “The first is ex parte communication.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 4062.3(f), (g), [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Other provisions of the Labor Code may present good cause to replace a QME.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, fn. 6, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “For example, a violation of section 4628 compels the exclusion of a QME’s report under subdivision (e) and could be considered by a WCJ in determining whether good cause existed for a QME’s replacement.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, fn. 6, citing Lab. Code, § 4628(e), [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “(a) A replacement QME to a panel, or at the discretion of the Medical Director a replacement of an entire panel of QMEs, shall be selected at random by the Medical Director and provided upon request whenever any of the following occurs[.]”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 31.5(a), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, [at p. 13](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=13).)

*Cross-references: § 1.4 (prospective application); § 16.9 (medical evaluations and OSAs); § 17.1 (discovery); ch. 9 remainder: reserved.*


## Chapter 14 · Penalties, Sanctions & Increased Compensation

### § 14.9  Defendant’s Remedies for Frivolous or Bad-Faith Claims

*● settled · en banc · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 14.9, p. 17 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-14-9)

> “While that goal is noble, that is not within the province of adequacy review.”
> — (Gaines, supra [protecting insured defendants from overpaying claims], [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “If a defendant believes that a claim is filed frivolously or in bad faith, they
> may file an appropriate petition and seek to recover the costs of litigation. (Cal. Code Regs,
> tit. 8, § 10421.) If a defendant believes in good faith that a claim may involve fraud, defendant
> may take appropriate measures to report suspected fraud. (Cal. Ins. Code, § 1877.3(b).)”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

*Cross-references: § 19.4 (what adequacy review is for); § 24.6 (fraud
reporting; criminal proceedings). Remainder of chapter: reserved.*


## Chapter 16 · Commencing & Managing the Case

### § 16.2  Identification of Parties and Liable Entities; the Coldiron Disclosures

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 16.2, p. 18 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-16-2)

> “Read together, WCAB Rules 10390, 10400 and 10401 ensure that all parties, representatives and liable entities are fully identified in each case.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “Under WCAB Rule 10390, which renumbered and simplified former WCAB Rule 10550, all parties must fully disclose their own legal name, the name of their attorney or non-attorney representative, the name of the insurer and employer, and the third-party administrator, while clarifying that the third-party administrator is not a party.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “WCAB Rule 10400, subdivision (b)(1) requires that all attorney representatives file a notice of representation or opening document that complies with WCAB Rule 10390 and includes “the name of the represented party.””
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10400(b)(1), [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “As a matter of course, if an attorney represents multiple parties or entities, all names of each represented party or entity must be disclosed. WCAB Rule 10401 imposes similar requirements on non-attorney representatives.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10401, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “[W]here an employer’s liability for workers’ compensation benefits is adjusted by a third-party administrator, the administrator must disclose to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, to the other parties in any proceeding in which it is a party, and to its own counsel the identity of its client, whether a self-insured employer or insurance carrier. If the client is an insurance carrier, the administrator must disclose whether the policy includes a “high self-insured retention,” a large deductible, or any other provision that affects the identity of the entity actually liable for the payment of compensation. Failure of the administrator to disclose the identity of its client may subject it to sanctions pursuant to Labor Code section 5813.”
> — (Coldiron v. Compuware Corp. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 289, 290–291 (Appeals Bd. en banc) [Coldiron I], as quoted in DiFusco, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “Fundamental to the establishment of workers’ compensation liability and the prompt delivery of benefits awarded to eligible injured workers is the designation of the responsible and liable entity. The responsible entity must be divulged at the earliest opportunity, and certainly no later than the commencement of the litigation process and formal proceedings. . . . In this manner, no confusion can result as to the liable entity, against whom an award for benefits will be made. It avoids unnecessary delays in the prompt delivery of benefits awarded.”
> — (Coldiron I, supra, 67 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 294 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in DiFusco, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> **HOLDING No. 3 · DIFUSCO (2025) · EN BANC · BINDING** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “WCAB Rule 10390 does not supersede the Coldiron decisions. Defendants must comply with WCAB Rule 10390 and the disclosure requirements in Coldiron I and II, regardless of whether there is a third-party administrator.”

> “[T]here is no basis to limit the disclosure requirements to third-party administrators.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “It bears repeating that the Appeals Board, in issuing Coldiron I en banc was concerned with disclosure of the entity responsible for payment in all cases, including any limits on liability for payment, and not just those with a third-party administrator.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “The burden to ascertain the identity of the entity liable for payment cannot be placed on the injured worker; the information is more readily available to a defendant, and the disclosure responsibility must lie with defendant.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “We observe that information as to the proper defendant is within a defendant’s control, and not an applicant’s, so that it is incumbent upon a defendant to comply with this responsibility.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “As outlined in Coldiron, and as further required by these rules, full disclosure of the names of each party or entity means that all essential parties are included in all awards, and so that awards are enforceable, a defendant must necessarily provide accurate information.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5806, 5807, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “Defendants are required by the Labor Code to pay all compensation that is due. If a dispute arises about who is responsible to pay compensation, an identified defendant may nevertheless be held liable, and sanctions may be imposed until such time as another responsible party is identified.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “[t]hese holdings remain in full force and effect, and the third-party administrators (or their counsel and/or representative) who do not comply with these holdings may be subject to sanctions.”
> — (Coldiron v. Compuware Corp. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 1466, 1470 (Appeals Bd. en banc) [Coldiron II], as quoted in DiFusco, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “The WCJ has a duty to inquire and ensure that the record reflects the correct identity of all parties, at first opportunity, including at the mandatory settlement conference and at trial.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “[T]he WCJ must exercise oversight to ensure that at the time an award or decision is issued, if applicant has sought this information, that defendant has disclosed and properly identified all liable entities and the relevant insurance policy details, in compliance with Coldiron I and this decision.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “WCJs are nevertheless responsible for ensuring that the legally correct names of parties and liable entities appear in case captions, rather than shortened or otherwise incorrect names found in EAMS.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 11, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “[L]ien claimants and applicants are similarly entitled to this information, and similarly unable to access it without disclosure by the defendant.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 7, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

*Cross-references: § 1.2 (why Coldiron still binds); § 17.1 (the discovery route to the same information); § 22.1 (policy provisions affecting liability); § 14.9 (sanctions generally).*


### § 16.3  Pleadings: Informality, Liberal Construction, Amendment to Conform to Proof

*● settled · en banc; Supreme Court and appellate as quoted · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 16.3, p. 21 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-16-3)

> “The workers’ compensation system “was intended to afford a simple and nontechnical path to relief.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 419, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Generally, “the informality of pleadings in workers' compensation proceedings before the Board has been recognized.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Zurich Ins. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 848, 852, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> ““[I]t is an often-stated principle that the Act disfavors application of formalistic rules of procedure that would defeat an employee's entitlement to rehabilitation benefits.””
> — (Martino v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 485, 490, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Courts have repeatedly rejected pleading technicalities as grounds for depriving the Board of jurisdiction.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Rubio v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 196, 200–201; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 148, 152–153, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> ““Necessarily, failure to comply with the rules as to details is not jurisdictional.””
> — (Rubio, supra, at pp. 200–201, as quoted in Perez, supra; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10517, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “Therefore, in workers’ compensation proceedings, it is settled law that (1) pleadings may be informal. (Zurich Ins. Co., supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 852; Beaida v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 204, 207– 210 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 345]); (2) claims should be adjudicated based on substance rather than form (Bland, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 328–334; Martino, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 491; (3) pleadings should liberally construed so as not to defeat or undermine an injured employee's right to make a claim (Sarabi v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925–926 [72 Cal.Comp.Cases 778]); Martino, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 490; and (4) technically deficient pleadings, if they give notice and are timely, normally do not deprive the Board of jurisdiction (Bland, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 331–332).”
> — (Perez, supra [internal citations in original], [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “These principles of liberal pleading are further reflected in section 5506, which authorizes the Appeals Board to relieve a defendant from default or dismissal due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 473.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

> “the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the protections afforded under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) are applicable in workers’ compensation proceedings.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Fox v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1196, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “WCAB Rule 10617 provides for considerable latitude in accepting nonstandard pleadings, so long as the pleadings contain “a combination of information sufficient to establish the case or cases to which the document relates or, if it is a case opening document, sufficient information to open an adjudication file.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10617(b), [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “Similarly, WCAB Rule 10517 specifies that pleadings are deemed amended to conform to the stipulations agreed to by the parties on the record or may be amended by the Appeals Board to conform to proof.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10517, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “The principles of liberal pleading and amendment of pleadings to conform to proof outlined above mean that any petition should be considered on its merits and not based on its title.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “In workers’ compensation proceedings, pleadings are liberally construed and may be amended to conform to proof.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 6](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=6).)

> “Therefore, based on these principles, interpretation of our rules must necessarily incorporate California’s public policy in favor of adjudication of claims on their merits, rather than on the technical sufficiency of the pleadings.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> “WCAB Rule 10515 specifically disallows “[d]emurrers, petitions for judgment on the pleadings and petitions for summary judgment.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10515, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

*Cross-references: § 16.2 (identification of parties); § 17.1 (informality of evidence: §§ 5708–5709); § 20.3 (petitions judged by substance, not title); § 21.3 (relief from default: § 5506).*


### § 16.9  Walk-Through Settlements; Notices of Intention

*● settled · en banc quoting regulation · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 16.9, p. 23 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-16-9)

> “A workers’ compensation judge who is presented with a walk-through
> settlement document shall approve it, disapprove it, suspend action on it, or accept it for later
> review and action.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10789(e), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “[A]ll supporting medical reports and other supporting documents not previously
> filed, shall be filed directly with the workers’ compensation judge at the date and time of
> the walk-through.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10789(b)(1), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “[A]ny order for an applicant to attend an evaluation may only issue after
> providing notice to the parties. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10832.) No such order may issue
> within an OSA.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “[A]ny order for an applicant to attend an evaluation may only issue after providing notice to the parties.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “Section 5701 allows the WCJ to “cause testimony to be taken, or inspection of the premises where the injury occurred to be made, or . . . direct any employee claiming compensation to be examined by a regular physician.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Lab. Code, § 5701; see also Lab. Code, § 5906, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

*Cross-references: §§ 19.2–19.3 (the OSA and the hearing); § 20.1
(record discipline at walk-throughs). Remainder of chapter: reserved.*

> “Further, if a medical evaluation is required to determine adequacy, such an evaluation may only be ordered after an evidentiary hearing has occurred, and the WCJ establishes a basis for such an order. Sections 4060 et seq. set forth the preferred framework for obtaining medical-legal reporting, and even though it is within the power of the WCJ to order applicant to be examined by a regular physician under section 5701, such procedures are generally used to resolve medical disputes after the parties have proceeded through the ordinary channels of discovery.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 4060 et seq., 5701 [seeds ch. 9], [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)


## Chapter 17 · Discovery & Evidence

### § 17.1  Discovery: Liberal Policy; No Good-Cause Showing for Routine Requests

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 17.1, p. 25 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-17-1)

> “Our holding herein is consistent with the public policy favoring liberal pre-trial discovery that may reasonably lead to relevant and admissible evidence applicable in workers’ compensation cases.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Allison v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 654, 663, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “We emphasize that in workers’ compensation proceedings, the Labor Code makes explicit that the WCJ and the Appeals Board have greater discretion with respect to evidentiary matters than courts in civil proceedings, and not narrower discretion as defendant appears to believe.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “Section 5708 mandates that we are not “bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of this division.””
> — (DiFusco, supra, quoting Lab. Code, § 5708, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “Section 5709 specifically allows informality in our proceedings and ensures that “admission into the record, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible under the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure” will not invalidate an order, decision or award.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5709, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “Unlike a discovery request where the right to privacy or another privilege is implicated, proof of good cause is not required for a routine discovery request such as the one here.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[A]pplicant has a right to the insurance coverage information and potentially liable parties purely by way of a discovery request for relevant information, even without the consideration of the specific disclosure requirements detailed herein.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “Under the Civil Discovery Act, discovery is generally available “regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action. . . .””
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 13, quoting Code Civ. Pro., § 2017.101 [sic; see Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010], [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “The underlying principle of liberal discovery supports our duty to ensure substantial justice and to further develop the record where there is insufficient evidence on an issue.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 12, citing Kuykendall v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396, 403; McClune v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1121–1122, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “The Appeals Board may not leave matters undeveloped where it is clear that additional discovery is needed.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 12, citing Kuykendall, supra, at p. 404, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “All hearings and investigations before the appeals board or a workers’ compensation judge are governed by this division and by the rules of practice and procedures adopted by the appeals board. In the conduct thereof they shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of this division. All oral testimony, objections, and rulings shall be taken down in shorthand by a competent phonographic reporter.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5708, as quoted in full in Perez, supra, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)

> “No informality in any proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony shall invalidate any order, decision, award, or rule made and filed as specified in this division. No order, decision, award, or rule shall be invalidated because of the admission into the record, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible under the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5709, as quoted in full in Perez, supra, [at p. 9](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=9).)

*Cross-references: § 16.2 (the Coldiron disclosures); § 22.1 (insurance policy information); § 20.1 (the admitted record).*


## Chapter 19 · Settlement

### § 19.1  No Settlement Without Approval

*● settled · statute; Supreme Court; en banc · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.1, p. 27 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-1)

> “[N]o release of liability or compromise agreement is valid unless it is
> approved by the appeals board or referee.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5001, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 17](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=17).)

> **HOLDING No. 1 · GAINES (2026) · EN BANC · BINDING** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “A workers’ compensation settlement is only enforceable after approval by the
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. In approving a settlement, a WCJ must consider whether
the agreement is valid and must determine whether the settlement is adequate in order to protect
the injured worker and the public interest.”

> “A tort release is effective upon execution, but a compromise and release of
> workmen’s compensation liability is invalid until approved… This inquiry by the
> referee should carry out the legislative objective of ‘protecting workmen who might agree
> to unfortunate compromises because of economic pressure or lack of competent advice.’
> … These safeguards against improvident releases place a workmen’s compensation
> release upon a higher plane than a private contractual release; it is a judgment, with ‘the
> same force and effect as an award made after a full hearing.’”
> — (Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 973,
quoting Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701, 702, and Raischell &
Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991, 997; as quoted
in Gaines, supra; accord Camacho v. Target (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291,
301–302 [as cited therein], [at p. 17](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=17).)


### § 19.2  Validity: A Settlement Is a Contract

*● settled · en banc; appellate as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.2, p. 28 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-2)

> “[T]he legal principles governing compromise and release agreements are the
> same as those governing other contracts.” … “For a compromise and release
> agreement to be effective, the necessary elements of a contract must exist, including an offer of
> settlement of a disputed claim by one of the parties, and an acceptance by the other.”
> — (Burbank Studios v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Yount) (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d 929, 935, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565,
1580 [as cited therein], [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of
> the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and
> lawful.”
> — (County of San Joaquin v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. (Sepulveda)
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “[T]he WCJ’s jurisdiction to approve a settlement is only as to those
> benefits provided by the Labor Code, and a settlement of any claims outside of the Labor Code is
> not enforceable.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “The WCAB’s jurisdiction is over claims for benefits provided in the Labor Code, and the WCAB has jurisdiction to approve settlement of claims for benefits that are provided by the Labor Code.”
> — (Gaines, supra [seeds ch. 2], [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “A proposed contract to settle a claim is in lieu of an award of compensation and the WCAB must determine whether it is valid.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5000–5003, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “Section 5003 states that every C&R shall contain the following information: (a) The date of the accident. (b) The average weekly wages of the employee, determined according to Chapter 1 of Part 2 of this division. (c) The nature of the disability, whether total or partial, permanent or temporary. (d) The amount paid, or due and unpaid, to the employee up to the date of the release or agreement or death, and the amount of the payment or benefits then or thereafter to be made. (e) The length of time such payment or benefit is to continue. (f) In the event a claim of lien under subdivision (f) or (g) of Section 4903 has been filed, the number of days and the amount of temporary disability indemnity which should be allowed to the lien claimant.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5003, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 17](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=17).)

> “The injured worker must have knowledge of each of the benefits that they may be entitled to, and they must intend to release those claims for benefits. Mere execution of the form is not sufficient.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 301, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “The preprinted form does not release claims that are outside of workers’ compensation, and even if a separate document is executed by the parties, the WCAB cannot approve a settlement of claims that are outside of the Labor Code.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “Thus, where the terms of the agreement are unclear or contradictory, or include provisions that are outside the Labor Code, the issue is whether a true contract has been formed.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “Pursuant to section 5500.5, all employers in a single cumulative injury are to be joined in a single action. While applicant is free to settle against one employer and pursue their claim against the others (§ 5500.5(c)), the employers must be joined in a single case as they have the right to be notified of any election or settlements made.”
> — (Gaines, supra, fn. 6, citing Lab. Code, § 5500.5 [seeds chs. 5, 16], [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)


### § 19.3  The Order Suspending Action and the Adequacy Hearing

*● settled · en banc · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.3, p. 30 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-3)

> **HOLDING No. 2 · GAINES (2026) · EN BANC · BINDING** [slip p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=2)
> “Where the terms of the settlement are inconsistent, do not comply with the Labor Code,
and / or are inadequate, the WCJ may investigate by issuing an order suspending action, and if
the parties do not provide sufficient information, the WCJ may hold a hearing to create an
evidentiary record that establishes the adequacy of a settlement.”

> “The parties to a controversy may stipulate the facts relative thereto in writing and file such stipulation with the appeals board. The appeals board may thereupon make its findings and award based upon such stipulation, or may set the matter down for hearing and take further testimony or make the further investigation necessary to enable it to determine the matter in controversy.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5702, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “(b) The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board shall inquire into the adequacy of all Compromise and Release agreements and Stipulations with Request for Award, and may set the matter for hearing to take evidence when necessary to determine whether the agreement should be approved or disapproved, or issue findings and awards.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10700(b), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “After reviewing a proposed settlement, the WCJ may issue an OSA.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10700(b), 10789(e), [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “An OSA more commonly issues where a minor error has occurred, which can be easily corrected without a formal hearing. In such a case, the OSA operates in a similar manner as a notice of intent.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10832, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “This is generally an accepted practice, particularly since workers’ compensation proceedings have traditionally proceeded with a degree of informality.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5708, 5709, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “When a settlement is submitted for approval, it is submitted as a stipulation that is signed by all parties, with a joint request that the stipulation be approved. (§ 5702.) There is generally no issue of due process when a WCJ approves a joint request of the parties.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[W]hen the WCJ intends to reject a settlement or requires additional
> information before approving a settlement, the WCJ must provide adequate due process, which
> includes notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[A]n evidentiary hearing should be set where the terms of the agreement are
> unclear, contradictory, include provisions that are outside the Labor Code, the concern over
> adequacy is significant, and / or the parties fail to provide a sufficient response to the
> OSA.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “Where the record does not adequately explain the value of the settlement, the WCJ may properly request supporting materials, including relevant medical records, civil case information in limited circumstances, and documentation supporting a request for attorney’s fees, and may delay approval until sufficient information is provided. However, the WCJ may not use an order suspending action to compel medical evaluations, dismissal with prejudice, or a reduction of attorney’s fees without notice, due process, and an appropriate record. The governing inquiry is whether the settlement is adequately supported by the information submitted, and if it is not, the proper remedy is to develop the record through appropriate procedures, including a hearing to create an evidentiary record.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)

> “We would also note that a dismissal with prejudice is generally reserved for cases that are being dismissed on the merits. Where a party seeks dismissal based on reasons other than the merits of litigation, e.g. lack of prosecution, the appropriate order is dismissal without prejudice.”
> — (Gaines, supra, fn. 10 [seeds ch. 16], [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “Pursuant to section 5702, the WCJ may seek further information or may set a hearing.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5702, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)


### § 19.4  What Adequacy Review Protects; What It Does Not

*● settled · en banc; Supreme Court as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.4, p. 32 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-4)

> “It has long been held that a C&R must provide fair compensation to the injured worker equivalent to what the injured worker would expect to receive from an award”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 17](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=17).)

> “The purpose of an award is not to make the employee whole for the loss which
> he or she has suffered, but to prevent the employee and his or her dependents from becoming
> public charges during the period of disability.”
> — (Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003)
30 Cal.4th 1281, 1286, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “Where benefits are due, they should be paid and the WCJ should ensure that payable benefits are not inappropriately shifted onto public systems, for example, Medicare, Medi-Cal, EDD, and Social Security. Adequacy review has the dual purpose of ensuring that an injured worker is appropriately paid benefits, which in turn benefits the public.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “If there is information in the record that indicates that an insurance company
> might be overvaluing a claim, that suggests that the settlement is adequate and that the WCJ
> should approve the settlement.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “To determine whether benefits are adequately paid, a WCJ requires information. The WCJ may not simply approve any settlement filed. The WCJ must independently review the settlement and determine that the settlement is adequate.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “(c) Agreements that provide for the payment of less than the full amount of compensation due or to become due and undertake to release the employer from all future liability will be approved only where it appears that a reasonable doubt exists as to the rights of the parties or that approval is in the best interest of the parties.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10700(c), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

> “Workers’ compensation was created, in part, to prevent an injured worker from becoming a public ward.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 18](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=18).)

*Cross-references: § 14.9 (what adequacy review is not for: protecting carriers from overpaying); § 19.5 (information bearing on adequacy).*


### § 19.5  Information Bearing on Adequacy: Medicals, Civil Actions, Scope

*● settled · en banc; regulation as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.5, p. 33 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-5)

> “When filing a Compromise and Release or a Stipulations with Request for Award,
> the filing party shall file all agreed medical evaluator reports, qualified medical evaluator
> reports, treating physician reports, and any other [medical records] that are relevant to a
> determination of the adequacy… that have not been filed previously.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10700(a), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “Parties may not withhold relevant medical records and / or either intentionally
> or negligently misrepresent that no such medical records exist.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “[The civil-case inquiry] could be appropriate in circumstances where the civil
> case overlaps with the workers’ compensation case, giving rise to a possible third-party
> credit… However, the WCJ’s inquiry should be limited in scope to address the issue
> of adequacy and whether any third-party credit exists or may exist, and it should take place on
> the record.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 3850 et seq. [seeds Ch. 23], [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “We emphasize that how much information is required to support adequacy will depend on the facts of each individual case.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “The WCJ reviewing adequacy is considering a multitude of issues, including valuation of future medical treatment, temporary disability, permanent disability, a supplemental job displacement voucher, and death benefits. The WCJ may also consider threshold issues as to whether compensation is due, such as employment, the statute of limitations, and affirmative defenses.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 19](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=19).)

> “Parties should file supporting, relevant medicals at the time they file a settlement.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “[T]he parties may wish to provide a statement from applicant, witness statements, depositions, recorded video of an injury, claim benefit letters including any denial letter, or any other information that will assist the WCJ in determining adequacy.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “The fact that an injured worker may wish to forego litigation and settle their claim provides no information to the WCJ as to how the claim should be valued. If the parties fail to provide enough information, they should expect approval of their settlement to be delayed so that the WCJ may obtain the necessary information either through issuance of an OSA, or through a formal hearing.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)


### § 19.6  Stipulations Are Not Held to Substantial-Evidence Proof

*● settled · en banc; appellate as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 19.6, p. 34 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-19-6)

> “One issue raised by the WCJ in these cases is the misconception that
> substantial medical evidence is required to determine adequacy of a stipulation. That is not
> true. Stipulations exist, in part, to obviate the need for evidence.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing County of Sacramento v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “There is no requirement that substantial medical evidence support a
> stipulation. The only requirement for adequacy review is that sufficient information exists in
> the formal record to support a WCJ’s decision on adequacy.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “A stipulation is ‘An agreement between opposing counsel . . . ordinarily entered into for the purpose of avoiding delay, trouble, or expense in the conduct of the action,’ (Ballentine, Law Dict. (1930) p. 1235, col. 2) and serves ‘to obviate need for proof or to narrow range of litigable issues’ (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1415, col. 1) in a legal proceeding.”
> — (Weatherall, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “The parties need only provide relevant information to permit the WCJ to determine adequacy.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)

> “There is no requirement that substantial medical evidence support a stipulation.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 21](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=21).)


## Chapter 20 · Trial & the Record

### § 20.1  Decisions Rest on the Admitted Record

*● settled · en banc; statute; appellate as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 20.1, p. 36 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-20-1)

> “Decisions of the Appeals Board ‘must be based on admitted evidence in
> the record.’”
> — (Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476
(Appeals Board en banc), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[D]ecisions of the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial
> evidence.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274; Garza v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312; LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970)
1 Cal.3d 627, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the
> WCJ’s decision.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5313; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§ 10787, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[O]ther than medical reporting which automatically becomes part of the record
> of proceedings under WCAB Rule 10803… any other information provided to the WCJ is not
> part of the record of proceedings and is not admitted as evidence. In particular, WCJs should be
> mindful that oral statements presented at a walk-through are not part of the court’s
> record.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “Workers’ compensation does not permit judgment on the pleadings.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10515, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “A WCJ cannot look beyond the settlement itself or the record of proceedings in determining adequacy.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10803, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “The Appeals Board cannot review the adequacy of a settlement without a formal record.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Hamilton, supra, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “This creates significant problems, particularly in cases where a party seeks to set aside the settlement, because there is no record to review. Thus, it may be more appropriate to set a hearing and admit such evidence so that the basis for a determination that the settlement is adequate is clear.”
> — (Gaines, supra [seeds ch. 25], [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “[O]ther than medical reporting which automatically becomes part of the record of proceedings under WCAB Rule 10803 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10803), any other information provided to the WCJ is not part of the record of proceedings and is not admitted as evidence.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 20](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=20).)

> “The WCJ and the Appeals Board have a duty to further develop the record where there is insufficient evidence on an issue.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing McClune v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1121–1122, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)


### § 20.2  Due Process Before the Board

*● settled · en banc; appellate as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 20.2, p. 37 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-20-2)

> “All parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain the fundamental
> right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States
> Constitutions.”
> — (Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151,
157–158, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence
> in regards to the issues.”
> — (Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 635,
fn. 22, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Fortich v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1452–1454 [as cited therein], [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “As a matter of due process, all parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157–158, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> ““Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in regards to the issues.””
> — (Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Milbauer) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 643, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “A fair hearing includes, but is not limited to, the opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses; introduce and inspect exhibits; and to offer evidence in rebuttal.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Gangwish v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295; Rucker, supra, at pp. 157–158; Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Baskin) (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 54, 58; Katzin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 703, 710, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “A denial of due process to a party ordinarily compels annulment of the Board’s decision only if it is reasonably probable that, absent the procedural error, the party would have attained a more favorable result. However, if the denial of due process prevents a party from having a fair hearing, the denial of due process is reversible per se.”
> — (Beverly Hills Multispecialty Group, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pinkney) (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 789, 806, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “It is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Fox, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> ““when a party in default moves promptly to seek relief, very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court's order setting aside a default.””
> — (Shamblin, supra, at p. 478, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> “This is particularly true in workers’ compensation cases, where there is a constitutional mandate “to accomplish substantial justice in all cases.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.)”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

> ““The principal purpose of vesting the court with the discretionary power to correct ‘a mistake in any other respect’ is to enable it to mold and direct its proceedings so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits, when it can be done without injustice to either party, whether the obstruction to such a disposition of cases be a mistake of fact or a mistake as to the law, although it may be that the court should require a stronger showing to justify relief from the effect of a mistake of law than of a mistake of fact.””
> — (Ward v. Clay (1890) 82 Cal. 502, as quoted in Perez, supra; see Dunzweiler v. Superior Court (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 569, 577, [at p. 8](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=8).)


### § 20.3  Electronic Witness Testimony (Rule 10817)

*◐ preliminary · en banc order granting reconsideration; final decision deferred · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 20.3, p. 39 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-20-3)

> ““If a witness intends to testify electronically, a petition showing good cause shall be filed pursuant to rule 10510 by the witness or by the party offering the witness’s testimony before the hearing, and shall identify the witness and contain the witness’s full legal name . . . .””
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10817(a), as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 6](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=6).)

> “Because an evidentiary record must be created to allow for appellate review, and to safeguard due process, a request for electronic testimony must not be denied without an opportunity to be heard.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> **PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION No. 1 · PEREZ (2025) · EN BANC · FINAL DECISION DEFERRED** [slip p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10)
> “a request on the record for electronic witness testimony at the beginning of the hearing, with an opportunity for any party to respond, satisfies the petition requirement and is sufficient to adjudicate the issue of electronic testimony.”

> — (Perez, supra [construing Rule 10817(a), as corrected by Opn. and Order Correcting Clerical Error (Aug. 14, 2025)], [at p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10).)

> **PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION No. 2 · PEREZ (2025) · EN BANC · FINAL DECISION DEFERRED** [slip p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10)
> “the due process right to a fair hearing and a determination based on the merits is good cause to allow the electronic testimony of the witness.”

> **PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION No. 3 · PEREZ (2025) · EN BANC · FINAL DECISION DEFERRED** [slip p. 10](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=10)
> “when a witness is unable to appear in person, as a matter of due process, a request to testify electronically should be readily permitted.”

*Cross-references: § 20.2 (due process and the fair hearing); § 16.3 (pleadings judged on substance); § 21.3 (finality of interlocutory orders).*


## Chapter 21 · Reconsideration, Removal & Judicial Review

### § 21.2  Reconsideration: The Sixty-Day Period After Transmission (§ 5909)

*● settled · en banc; statute as quoted · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 21.2, p. 40 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-21-2)

> “a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing.”
> — (Perez, supra, describing former Lab. Code, § 5909, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

> “(a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board. (b) (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board. (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5909, as amended eff. July 2, 2024, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

> “Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 3](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=3).)

> “Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.””
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 3](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=3).)

> “Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 3](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=3).)

> “Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report shall be notice of transmission.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 7](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=7).)

*Cross-references: § 21.3 (effect of a grant); §§ 21.8–21.10 (removal, consolidation, disqualification). Remainder of chapter: reserved.*


### § 21.3  Grant of Reconsideration: Effect, Continuing Jurisdiction, and Finality

*● settled · en banc; Supreme Court and appellate as quoted · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 21.3, p. 41 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-21-3)

> “A grant of reconsideration has the effect of causing “the whole subject matter [to be] reopened for further consideration and determination” (Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool) (1923) 191 Cal.724, 729 [10 Industrial Acc. Com. 322]) and of “[throwing] the entire record open for review.””
> — (Perez, supra, quoting Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool) (1923) 191 Cal. 724, 729; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George) (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201, 203, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “Thus, once reconsideration has been granted, the Appeals Board has the full power to make new and different findings on issues presented for determination at the trial level, even with respect to issues not raised in the petition for reconsideration before it.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5907, 5908, 5908.5; Gonzales v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 364, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> ““[t]here is no provision in chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence of a statutory authority limitation none will be implied.””
> — (Gonzales, supra, at p. 364, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “The WCAB has continuing jurisdiction over its orders, decisions, and awards. . . . At any time, upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing therefor.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5803, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> ““The WCAB . . . is a constitutional court; hence, its final decisions are given res judicata effect.””
> — (Azadigian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 372, 374, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]), or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits.”
> — (Perez, supra [internal citations in original], [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders.”
> — (Perez, supra, citing Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075, [at p. 11](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=11).)

> “No cause of action arising out of any final order, decision or award made and filed by the appeals board or a workers’ compensation judge shall accrue in any court to any person until and unless the appeals board on its own motion sets aside the final order, decision, or award and removes the proceeding to itself or if the person files a petition for reconsideration, and the reconsideration is granted or denied.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5901, as quoted in Perez, supra, [at p. 12](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=12).)

> “We correct these clerical errors by virtue of this decision without granting reconsideration, as such errors may be corrected without further proceedings at any time.”
> — (Perez, supra, Opn. and Order Correcting Clerical Error (Aug. 14, 2025), citing Toccalino v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 543, 558, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “Once a final decision after reconsideration is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code section 5950 et seq.”
> — (Perez, supra, [at p. 2](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/perez-v-chicago-dogs-2025-adj16597333-wcab-en-banc#page=2).)

> “Threshold issues include, but are not limited to, the following: injury arising out of and in the course of employment (AOE/COE); jurisdiction; the existence of an employment relationship; and statute of limitations.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Capital Builders Hardware, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Gaona) (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 658, 662, [at p. 4](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=4).)

> “Such interlocutory decisions include, but are not limited to, pre-trial orders regarding evidence, discovery, trial setting, venue, or similar issues.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 4](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=4).)

> “If a decision includes a determination of a “threshold” issue, then it is treated as a “final” decision, regardless of whether all issues are resolved or whether there is an ultimate decision on the right to benefits.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Aldi v. Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn (2006) 71 Cal.Comp.Cases 783, 784, fn. 2 (Appeals Bd. en banc), [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “Where a decision contains both final and non-final determinations, it is a hybrid decision.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “Thus, when a party challenges a hybrid decision, the petition seeking relief is treated as a petition for reconsideration because the determination on the threshold issue is final and binding on the Appeals Board and all parties to the case.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “When a petition is treated as one for reconsideration, then, the Appeals Board follows section 5908.5 and considers the merits of any final findings, awards, or orders. If the Appeals Board does not disturb the final finding, award, or order, or affirms it, the parties’ remedy is to seek appellate relief.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5908.5, 5950 et seq, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “If no further relief is sought, the finding, award, or order, is binding on all parties as the “law of the case.””
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5904; Goodrich v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 604, 611, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “However, where a petitioner challenges a WCJ’s determination regarding an interlocutory issue, the Appeals Board will apply the removal standard applicable to non-final decisions with respect to that issue.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “Notably, decisions on interlocutory or interim issues by a WCJ or the Appeals Board may still be challenged by a petition for reconsideration once a final decision is issued.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

*Cross-references: § 21.2 (the sixty-day period); ch. 25 (reopening & enforcement: reserved).*


### § 21.8  Removal

*● settled · en banc · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 21.8, p. 44 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-21-8)

> “The appeals board may appoint one or more workers’ compensation
> administrative law judges in any proceeding, as it may deem necessary or advisable, and may
> refer, remove to itself, or transfer to a workers’ compensation administrative law judge
> the proceedings on any claim.”
> — (Lab. Code, § 5310, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5; Kleemann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “This violates the parties’ due process rights, which constitutes irreparable harm and thus, removal is warranted.”
> — (Gaines, supra [re an OSA compelling medical evaluations without hearing], [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

> “The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a); Cortez, supra; Kleemann, supra, [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)

> “A petitioner must also demonstrate that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner ultimately issues.”
> — (Vazquez, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a), [at p. 5](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/vazquez-v-renteria-2025-adj11017003-wcab-en-banc#page=5).)


### § 21.9  Consolidation; Vacating an OSA

*● settled · en banc; regulation as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 21.9, p. 45 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-21-9)

> “Consolidation may be ordered by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
> (‘WCAB’) on its own motion[.]”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10396(b), as quoted in Gaines, supra;
see § 10396(a) [common issues of fact and law; avoiding inconsistent orders], [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[W]here no formal record exists, upon receipt of a petition for removal or
> reconsideration of an OSA, and consistent with WCAB Rules 10955 and 10961, the WCJ may vacate
> the OSA and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10955(d), 10961, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)


### § 21.10  Disqualification of the WCJ

*● settled · en banc; statute as quoted · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 21.10, p. 45 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-21-10)

> “Section 5311 provides that a WCJ may be disqualified upon any one or more of
> the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641.”
> — (Gaines, supra; Lab. Code, § 5311, [at p. 24](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=24).)

> “Among the grounds for disqualification under section 641 are that the WCJ has
> ‘formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action’
> (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(f)) or that the WCJ has demonstrated ‘[t]he existence of a state of
> mind … evincing enmity against or bias toward either party.’ (Code Civ. Proc.,
> § 641(g).)”
> — (Gaines, supra [disqualification ordered on both grounds], [at p. 24](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=24).)

> “Every workers’ compensation administrative law judge shall abide by the Code of Judicial Ethics.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9721.1, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canons 1–3 [seeds ch. 24], [at p. 25](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=25).)

> “A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.”
> “A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.”
> “A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”
> — (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canons 1–3, as quoted in Gaines, supra [seeds ch. 24], [at p. 25](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=25).)


## Chapter 22 · Insurance & Coverage

### § 22.1  Disclosure of Insurance Policies and Provisions Affecting Liability

*● settled · en banc · quotations verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 22.1, p. 47 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-22-1)

> “When an applicant seeks information about the liable entity or the insurance policy provisions, the information should be readily provided.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, [at p. 14](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=14).)

> “Discovery must be provided regarding “the existence and contents of any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable,” including “the identity of the carrier and the nature and limits of the coverage.””
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 13, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.210, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[I]n a workers’ compensation matter, liability for payment of compensation to an applicant is an ongoing duty, that often stretches for many years after an underlying award is issued. This means that the ability to identify any parties that may potentially be liable to pay compensation in the future, and the parameters of that liability, is significantly more important in workers’ compensation proceedings.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 13, [at p. 15](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=15).)

> “[F]inal decisions of the WCAB may be converted to civil judgments, and without proper identification of the liable party or parties, an award may be rendered unenforceable.”
> — (DiFusco, supra, fn. 14, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5806, 5807, [at p. 16](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/difusco-v-hands-on-spa-2025-adj7445107-wcab-en-banc#page=16).)

*Cross-references: § 16.2 (identification duties); § 17.1 (the discovery route); ch. 25 (enforcement of awards: reserved).*


## Chapter 24 · Fraud, Ethics & Professional Conduct

### § 24.6  Fraud Reporting; Criminal Proceedings Distinct

*● settled · en banc; statute · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 24.6, p. 48 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-24-6)

> “If a defendant believes in good faith that a claim may involve fraud, defendant
> may take appropriate measures to report suspected fraud. (Cal. Ins. Code, § 1877.3(b).)”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “Proceedings before the Appeals Board have no bearing upon subsequent criminal
> proceedings.”
> — (Gaines, supra, fn. 11, citing Lab. Code, § 5006, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

*Cross-references: § 14.9 (the same fraud-reporting duty in the sanctions context; Ins. Code § 1877.3(b) also printed there).*


## Chapter 26 · Attorney’s Fees

### § 26.1  The Reasonable Fee; the Board as Final Arbiter

*● settled · en banc; statute · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 26.1, p. 49 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-26-1)

> “[N]o ‘charge, claim, or agreement for legal services . . . is
> enforceable, valid, or binding in excess of a reasonable amount. The appeals board may determine
> what constitutes a reasonable amount.’”
> — (Lab. Code, § 4906(a), as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “Attorneys are prohibited from demanding or accepting a fee until the amount is
> approved by the Appeals Board.”
> — (Gaines, supra, citing Vierra v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131, [at p. 22](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=22).)

> “The Legislature has thus spoken clearly and
> decisively that attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases cannot exceed an amount that
> is ‘reasonable’ and that the WCAB shall be the final arbiter of reasonableness in all
> cases.”
> — (Vierra, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131, as quoted in Gaines, supra, [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)

> “In establishing a reasonable attorney’s fee, the workers’
> compensation judge or arbitrator shall consider the: (a) Responsibility assumed by the attorney;
> (b) Care exercised in representing the applicant; (c) Time involved; and (d) Results
> obtained.”
> — (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10844, as quoted in Gaines, supra;
see Lab. Code, § 4906(d), [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)


### § 26.6  Disputed Fees at Settlement Approval

*● settled · en banc · verified 8/24/26 · cite: Blackletter § 26.6, p. 49 (2026)* — [in the book](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/#sec-26-6)

> “When an issue as to the amount of the attorney’s fee arises, the attorney
> is still entitled to due process to establish the reasonableness of a fee, and any order regarding
> a disputed fee must be supported by a record. If the C&R is found adequate, but the adequacy
> of the attorney’s fee remains in question, the WCJ may approve the C&R with the
> requested attorney’s fee held in trust pending a hearing on the issue.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)

> “If the documents presented are sufficient to establish that the requested attorney’s fee is reasonable, the WCJ may award it.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)

> “Thus, if the WCJ does not intend to award the requested fee, the appropriate procedure is to set the matter for a hearing.”
> — (Gaines, supra, [at p. 23](https://cacomplaw.aai.dev/pdf/gaines-v-abm-aviation-inc-2026-adj20216367-wcab-en-banc#page=23).)


---

## Finding Aids

### Table of Cases

- Aldi v. Carr, McClellan, Ingersoll, Thompson & Horn (2006) 71 Cal.Comp.Cases 783 (en banc) — § 21.3
- Allison v. WCAB (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 654 — § 17.1
- Alvarez v. WCAB (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 575 — § 9.6
- Azadigian v. WCAB (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 372 — § 21.3
- Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Merzoian) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 89 — § 1.3
- Beaida v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 204 — § 16.3
- Beverly Hills Multispecialty Group, Inc. v. WCAB (Pinkney) (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 789 — § 20.2
- Bland v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 324 — § 16.3
- Burbank Studios v. WCAB (Yount) (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929 — § 19.2
- Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291 — §§ 19.1–19.2
- Capital Builders Hardware, Inc. v. WCAB (Gaona) (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 658 — § 21.3
- Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701 — § 19.1
- City of Long Beach v. WCAB (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298 — § 1.1
- Coldiron v. Compuware Corp. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 1466 (en banc) [Coldiron II] — § 16.2
- Coldiron v. Compuware Corp. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 289 (en banc) [Coldiron I] — § 16.2
- Corrado v. Aquafine Corp. (2016) ADJ9150447 (panel) — § 9.6
- Cortez v. WCAB (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596 — § 21.8
- County of Sacramento v. WCAB (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114 — § 19.6
- County of San Joaquin v. WCAB (Sepulveda) (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1180 — § 19.2
- Dennis v. State of California (2020) 85 Cal.Comp.Cases 389 (en banc) — §§ 1.3, 2.1
- Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. WCAB (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 911 — § 1.3
- Department of Rehabilitation v. WCAB (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281 — § 19.4
- DiFusco v. Hands On Spa (2025) ADJ7445107 (en banc) — §§ 1.1–1.3, 16.2, 17.1, 22.1
- Dunzweiler v. Superior Court (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 569 — § 20.2
- Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410 — § 16.3
- Farris v. Industrial Wire Products (2000) 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 824 (en banc) — § 1.4
- Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812 — § 1.4
- Fortich v. WCAB (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1449 — § 20.2
- Fox v. WCAB (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1196 — §§ 16.3, 20.2
- Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (en banc) — passim
- Gangwish v. WCAB (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284 — § 20.2
- Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 — § 20.1
- Gee v. WCAB (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418 — § 1.1
- Gonzales v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360 — § 21.3
- Goodrich v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 604 — § 21.3
- Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool) (1923) 191 Cal. 724 — § 21.3
- Griffith v. WCAB (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1260 — § 1.1
- Guitron v. Santa Fe Extruders (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 228 (en banc) — § 1.1
- Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473 (en banc) — § 20.1
- Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709 — § 1.4
- In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254 — § 1.4
- Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964 — § 19.1
- Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Baskin) (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 54 — §§ 1.3, 20.2
- Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. WCAB (Kramer) (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39 — § 21.3
- Katzin v. WCAB (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 703 — § 20.2
- Kleemann v. WCAB (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274 — § 21.8
- Kuykendall v. WCAB (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396 — §§ 1.3, 17.1
- Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 — § 20.1
- LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 — § 20.1
- Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. WCAB (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 148 — § 16.3
- Maranian v. WCAB (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068 — § 21.3
- Martino v. WCAB (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 485 — § 16.3
- Maxham v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2017) 82 Cal.Comp.Cases 136 (en banc) — § 9.6
- McClune v. WCAB (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1117 — §§ 17.1, 20.1
- McDuffie v. L.A. County Metro. Transit Auth. (2002) 67 Cal.Comp.Cases 138 (en banc) — § 9.6
- McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348 — § 1.3
- Messele v. Pitco Foods, Inc. (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 1318 (en banc) — §§ 1.4, 9.6
- People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467 — § 1.2
- Perez v. Chicago Dogs (2025) ADJ16597333 (en banc) — §§ 1.1, 1.3, 16.3, 16.9, 17.1, 20.1–20.3, 21.2–21.3
- Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991 — § 19.1
- Rea v. WCAB (Milbauer) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625 — §§ 1.3, 20.2, 21.3
- Rubio v. WCAB (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 196 — § 16.3
- Rucker v. WCAB (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151 — §§ 20.1–20.2, 21.8
- Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171 — § 21.3
- Safeway Stores, Inc. v. WCAB (Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528 — § 21.3
- Sarabi v. WCAB (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 920 — § 16.3
- Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474 — § 20.2
- Signature Fruit Co. v. WCAB (Ochoa) (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 790 — § 1.2
- State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George) (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201 — § 21.3
- Suon v. California Dairies (2018) 83 Cal.Comp.Cases 1803 (en banc) — § 9.6
- Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 — § 1.3
- Toccalino v. WCAB (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 543 — § 21.3
- Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995 — § 1.4
- Tyler v. WCAB (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 389 — § 9.6
- Vazquez v. Renteria (2025) ADJ11017003 (en banc) — §§ 1.1, 1.3–1.4, 2.1, 9.6, 21.3, 21.8
- Vierra v. WCAB (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1128 — § 26.1
- Ward v. Clay (1890) 82 Cal. 502 — § 20.2
- Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (Mason) (1916) 172 Cal. 407 — § 1.3
- Zurich Ins. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 848 — § 16.3

### Table of Statutes & Regulations


**California Constitution**

- art. XIV, § 4 — § 1.3
- art. XX, § 21 — § 16.3

**Labor Code**

- §§ 52, 5300–5302 — § 1.3
- § 111 — §§ 1.3, 9.6
- §§ 111, 115 — §§ 1.1, 1.3
- § 133 — § 1.3
- § 139.2(g), (j)(1) — § 9.6
- § 3200 et seq. — § 1.3
- § 3201 — § 16.3
- § 3850 et seq. — § 19.5
- § 4060 et seq. — § 16.9
- § 4062.3(f), (g) — § 9.6
- § 4062.5 — § 9.6
- § 4903(f), (g) — § 19.2
- § 4906(a) — § 26.1
- § 4906(d) — § 26.1
- §§ 5000–5003 — § 19.2
- § 5001 — § 19.1
- § 5003 — § 19.2
- § 5006 — § 24.6
- § 5300 — § 2.1
- § 5307 — § 1.3
- § 5310 — § 21.8
- § 5311 — § 21.10
- § 5313 — § 20.1
- § 5500.3 — § 1.3
- § 5500.5 — § 19.2
- § 5506 — § 16.3
- § 5701 — §§ 16.9, 17.1
- § 5702 — § 19.3
- § 5708 — §§ 17.1, 19.3
- § 5709 — §§ 17.1, 19.3
- § 5803 — § 21.3
- §§ 5806, 5807 — § 22.1
- § 5813 — § 16.2
- § 5901 — § 21.3
- § 5903 — § 20.1
- § 5904 — § 21.3
- § 5906 — § 16.9
- §§ 5907, 5908, 5908.5 — § 21.3
- § 5908.5 — § 21.3
- § 5909 — § 21.2
- §§ 5950–5956 — § 1.2
- § 5952(d) — § 20.1

**Civil Code**

- §§ 1550, 1565, 1580 — § 19.2

**Code of Civil Procedure**

- § 473 — § 16.3
- § 641(f), (g) — § 21.10
- § 2017.010 [quoted as § 2017.101] — § 17.1
- § 2017.210 — § 22.1

**Government Code**

- §§ 11410.20(a), 11415.10(a) — § 1.3
- § 11425.60(b) — § 1.1
- § 11500 — § 1.3

**Insurance Code**

- § 1877.3(b) — §§ 14.9, 24.6

**Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8**

- § 31.3 — § 9.6
- § 31.5 — § 9.6
- § 60 — § 9.6
- § 9721.1 — § 21.10
- § 10305(k) — § 1.1
- § 10325 — § 1.1
- § 10390 — §§ 1.3, 16.2
- § 10396(a), (b) — § 21.9
- § 10400 — §§ 1.3, 16.2
- § 10401 — §§ 1.3, 16.2
- § 10421 — § 14.9
- § 10510 — § 20.3
- § 10515 — §§ 17.1, 19.3, 20.1
- § 10517 — § 16.3
- § 10550 (repealed) — § 16.2
- § 10617(b) — § 16.3
- § 10618 — § 20.3
- §§ 10700(a)–(c) — §§ 19.3–19.5
- § 10787 — § 20.1
- § 10789(b)(1) — § 16.9
- § 10789(e) — §§ 16.9, 19.3
- § 10803 — § 20.1
- § 10817 — § 20.3
- § 10832 — §§ 16.9, 19.3
- § 10844 — § 26.1
- § 10955(a) — § 21.8
- §§ 10955(d), 10961 — § 21.9

**Code of Judicial Ethics**

- canons 1–3 — § 21.10

### Index

- Adequacy review — purposes of §§ 19.1, 19.4; procedure § 19.3; information bearing on § 19.5; not for carrier’s protection § 14.9
- Appeals Board as court § 1.3
- Approval of settlement — required § 19.1; walk-through § 16.9; fees at § 26.6
- Attorney’s fees — reasonableness, factors § 26.1; demand or acceptance before approval prohibited § 26.1; disputed, held in trust § 26.6
- Awards — enforceability requires accurate identification §§ 16.2, 22.1
- Bias of judge — disqualification for § 21.10
- Captions, correct names in (EAMS) § 16.2
- Clerical error, correction of § 21.3
- Coldiron disclosures §§ 16.2, 22.1
- Compromise and release — required contents (§ 5003) § 19.2; fair-compensation standard § 19.4; release limited to known benefits § 19.2
- Consolidation § 21.9
- Contract, settlement as § 19.2
- Costs, frivolous or bad-faith claim § 14.9
- Default, relief from (§ 5506; CCP § 473) § 16.3
- Discovery — liberal policy § 17.1; good cause not required § 17.1; insurance information §§ 17.1, 22.1; duty to develop record § 17.1; greater evidentiary discretion than civil courts § 17.1
- Dismissal — with and without prejudice § 19.3
- Disqualification of WCJ § 21.10
- Due process §§ 19.3, 20.2, 26.6
- EAMS — transmission to Appeals Board § 21.2
- Electronic testimony (Rule 10817) — petition or on-record request § 20.3; good cause § 20.3
- En banc decisions — weight of §§ 1.1–1.2; stare decisis § 1.2; not superseded by regulation §§ 1.2–1.3
- Evidence — decisions on admitted record § 20.1; substantial §§ 20.1, 19.6
- Ex parte communication with QME/AME § 9.6
- Fair hearing — contents of § 20.2; denial reversible per se § 20.2
- Final orders — defined; interlocutory orders not final § 21.3
- Fraud — reporting §§ 14.9, 24.6; criminal proceedings distinct § 24.6
- Hearing on the merits, policy favoring §§ 16.3, 20.2
- Hybrid decisions (final + interlocutory) § 21.3; threshold issues listed § 21.3
- Identification of parties and liable entities § 16.2
- Insurance policies — disclosure of provisions affecting liability §§ 16.2, 22.1
- Joinder — cumulative injury employers (§ 5500.5) § 19.2
- Judgment on the pleadings, not permitted § 20.1
- Judicial ethics, WCJs bound by § 21.10
- Jurisdiction — exclusive, of WCAB § 2.1; to determine replacement-panel validity § 9.6
- Labor Code, settlement of claims outside § 19.2
- Law of the case § 21.3
- Liens — entitled to liable-entity information § 16.2
- Medical evaluations — may not be compelled by OSA § 16.9
- Medical records — filing with settlement § 19.5; withholding prohibited § 19.5
- Medical-legal evaluation — may not be ordered without evidentiary hearing § 16.9
- Notice of intention — OSA operating as § 19.3; walk-through § 16.9
- Order suspending action (OSA) §§ 19.3, 16.9, 21.9
- Panel decisions — not binding; citeable if persuasive § 1.1
- Pleadings — informality and liberal construction § 16.3; amendment to conform to proof § 16.3; substance over title §§ 16.3, 20.3
- Precedent decisions (Gov. Code, § 11425.60(b)) § 1.1
- Prospective application of new interpretations § 1.4
- Public interest, adequacy and § 19.4
- QME — replacement: statutory rights (ex parte; untimely report) § 9.6; unavailability, good-cause factors § 9.6; discipline for unavailability § 9.6
- Reconsideration — sixty-day period after transmission (§ 5909) § 21.2; effect of grant § 21.3; continuing jurisdiction § 21.3
- Record — adequate and complete § 20.1; oral statements at walk-through not part of § 20.1
- Regulations — Appeals Board rulemaking authority § 1.3; cannot supersede en banc precedent § 1.2
- Removal § 21.8
- Removal — standard (substantial prejudice or irreparable harm) § 21.8
- Res judicata, WCAB final decisions § 21.3
- Sanctions — failure to disclose § 16.2
- Stare decisis § 1.2
- Statutory construction — plain meaning canons § 1.4
- Stipulations — substantial evidence not required § 19.6; § 5702 § 19.3
- Third-party actions, credit § 19.5
- Third-party administrators — disclosure duties § 16.2
- Walk-through settlements § 16.9
- WCJ — duty to inquire as to identity of parties § 16.2

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