Cite: The Blackletter on California Workers’ Compensation § _._ (2026). Short form: Blackletter § _._ The section number is the primary pinpoint; each edition is also paginated, and a pin cite may add the edition page: Blackletter § 19.3, p. 5 (2026). Page numbers are permanent within an edition (editions are frozen); a new edition may repaginate, which is why the year binds the page.
The census rule. This edition contains only the law stated in its corpus, quoted verbatim. The corpus of this printing is one decision: Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (Appeals Board en banc), 30 pages, retrieved from dir.ca.gov and machine-verified 2026-08-23. Statutes, regulations, and earlier decisions appear only as, and exactly as, that decision quotes them. If it is not in the corpus, it is not in the book. Sections awaiting authority are marked reserved and are blank.
Weight. En banc decisions of the Appeals Board are binding precedent on all Appeals Board panels and workers’ compensation administrative law judges (see § 1.1). All grades in this printing are ● settled on that basis, within the four corners of the corpus.
Section headings, grades, and cross-references are finding aids; the quotations are the book. Free to read, always. Not legal advice; not a government publication. Free official help for injured workers: DWC Information & Assistance, 1-800-736-7401, dir.ca.gov. Corrections: /about. The engine: U.S. Pat. App. No. 19/782,460 (patent pending). The machinery is patent-pending; the law is free.
Every treatise before this one asked its reader to trust an author. The author read the cases, decided what mattered, and restated the law in the author’s words — and the reader’s confidence rested, finally, on the author’s care. This book makes a different offer. It contains no restatements. Every sentence of law in its body is a court’s sentence, quoted verbatim, checked by machine against the source it came from, and shelved at the address where the doctrine lives. Where the courts have not spoken, the page says so and stands blank. Where they disagree, the fork is shown, not smoothed.
The book is compiled by a census, not a selection: every rule-stating line of every decision in its corpus is here, and the corpus of each printing is stated on its edition page. A blank chapter is not unfinished work — it is an honest report that the corpus has not yet reached that shelf. As the corpus grows, the book grows, in public, with its changelog, and nothing once printed is ever silently altered: revisions supersede; they do not erase.
My part is the arrangement, the apparatus, and the promise that the machine checked every quotation — a compiler’s part, not an author’s. The law belongs to the courts that wrote it and to the workers and employers it governs. It is presented here free, to everyone, because the law of California should cost nothing to read.
S.R.W.
Santa Clarita, California
2026
Citing. Cite as The Blackletter on California Workers’ Compensation § 19.3 (2026); short form Blackletter § 19.3. The year is the edition. The section number is the primary pinpoint; each frozen edition is also paginated, so a pin cite may add the page: Blackletter § 19.3, p. 5 (2026). Section numbers are permanent: once published, a number never changes meaning.
Reading a section. The quotations are the law and cite as the treatise. Signed chapter overviews are citable as attributed commentary ([Author], Overview, Blackletter ch. 19 (2026)); practice notes cite as practice commentary (PN 19.3). Headings, grades, and cross-references are finding aids. Plain-language mirror pages are the one non-citable surface — they simplify for access; the professional section controls. A boxed HOLDING is law made by the corpus decision itself, marked with its weight (en banc decisions bind all panels and judges; see § 1.1). Each section’s meter line shows three separate facts: the settledness grade (● settled · ◐ split · ○ open/commentary), the authority-status check with its date, and the verification date. Verification means the quoted text matches its source as of that date. It is not a warranty that the authority remains good law — always confirm currency before filing.
Finding things. Enter by the Contents, by the Table of Cases (G), the Table of Statutes & Regulations (H), or the Index (I) — all generated from the corpus itself. A chapter marked reserved is blank because the corpus has not yet reached it; that is a statement about the corpus, never about the law.
What this book is not. It is legal information, not legal advice, and reading it creates no attorney-client relationship. It is not a government publication. Errors, when found, are recorded publicly and promptly at /about — a book that shows its corrections is asking to be checked, and should be.
This book is assembled, checked, and kept current by a machine method called RICHARD WEBER — Recursive Intelligence through Cascading Hierarchical Architecture with Reduction to Dynamic Work Enhancement via Bidirectional Engagement and Recursion — the subject of U.S. Patent Application No. 19/782,460 (patent pending), named for the man on the dedication page and filed on his birthday.
In plain terms, the method reads every decision in sequence through configured stages that check one another’s work; a later stage may formally dispute an earlier stage’s extraction — naming it, quoting it verbatim — and the disputed stage must answer; after the whole corpus is read, the work is re-examined in light of everything learned. Every quotation printed here passed through that discipline and was machine-checked, character by character, against its source. When the machine cannot verify something, it does not guess — it refuses, and the page says so.
The machinery is patent-pending; the law is free. The patent covers the reading and verification machinery — never the law itself, which no one owns. This book may be read, quoted, and cited by anyone, forever, without charge. Use of its text to train machine-learning models is prohibited; preservation copying by libraries and archives is welcomed and licensed.
| 1 | The System | § 1.1 populated · p. 1 |
| 2 | Jurisdiction & Coverage | reserved |
| 3 | The Employment Relationship | reserved |
| 4 | Injury: AOE/COE | reserved |
| 5 | Specific & Cumulative Injury; Limitations | reserved |
| 6 | Psychiatric Injury | reserved |
| 7 | Presumptions | reserved |
| 8 | Medical Treatment | reserved |
| 9 | The Medical-Legal Process | reserved |
| 10 | Temporary Disability | reserved |
| 11 | Permanent Disability & Rating | reserved |
| 12 | Apportionment | reserved |
| 13 | Death Benefits | reserved |
| 14 | Penalties, Sanctions & Increased Compensation | § 14.9 populated · p. 2 |
| 15 | Return to Work & Vouchers | reserved |
| 27 | State Funds: SIBTF & UEBTF | reserved |
| 16 | Commencing & Managing the Case | § 16.9 populated · p. 3 |
| 17 | Discovery & Evidence | reserved |
| 18 | Liens & Costs | reserved |
| 19 | Settlement | §§ 19.1–19.6 populated · pp. 4–6 |
| 20 | Trial & the Record | §§ 20.1–20.2 populated · p. 7 |
| 21 | Reconsideration, Removal & Judicial Review | §§ 21.8–21.10 populated · p. 8 |
| 22 | Insurance & Coverage | reserved |
| 23 | Third-Party Actions & Subrogation | reserved · seeded (see § 19.5) |
| 24 | Fraud, Ethics & Professional Conduct | § 24.6 populated · p. 9 |
| 25 | Reopening & Enforcement of Awards | reserved |
| 26 | Attorney’s Fees | §§ 26.1, 26.6 populated · p. 9 |
| 28 | Claims Administration & Defense | reserved |
| G | Table of Cases | 21 cases · generated from corpus |
| H | Table of Statutes & Regulations | 26 provisions · generated |
| I | Index | generated |
Appendices A–F: reserved. Populated: 17 sections from 1 decision; finding aids generated from the corpus. Everything else awaits its authority.
“En banc decisions of the Appeals Board are binding precedent on all Appeals Board panels and workers’ compensation administrative law judges.”
(Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (Appeals Bd. en banc), fn. 1, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10325; City of Long Beach v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 316, fn. 5; Gee v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1424, fn. 6, at p. 1.)
“This en banc decision is also adopted as a precedent decision pursuant to Government Code section 11425.60(b).”
(Gaines, supra, fn. 1, at p. 1.)
Cross-references: §§ 19.1–19.6, 20.1–20.2, 21.8–21.10, 24.6, 26.1, 26.6 (the corpus’s en banc rules). Remainder of chapter: reserved.
“If a defendant believes that a claim is filed frivolously or in bad faith, they may file an appropriate petition and seek to recover the costs of litigation. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, § 10421.) If a defendant believes in good faith that a claim may involve fraud, defendant may take appropriate measures to report suspected fraud. (Cal. Ins. Code, § 1877.3(b).)”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 22.)
“While that goal is noble, that is not within the province of adequacy review.”
(Gaines, supra [protecting insured defendants from overpaying claims], at p. 22.)
Cross-references: § 19.4 (what adequacy review is for); § 24.6 (fraud reporting; criminal proceedings). Remainder of chapter: reserved.
“A workers’ compensation judge who is presented with a walk-through settlement document shall approve it, disapprove it, suspend action on it, or accept it for later review and action.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10789(e), as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 16.)
“[A]ll supporting medical reports and other supporting documents not previously filed, shall be filed directly with the workers’ compensation judge at the date and time of the walk-through.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10789(b)(1), as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 20.)
“[A]ny order for an applicant to attend an evaluation may only issue after providing notice to the parties. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10832.) No such order may issue within an OSA.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 21.)
Cross-references: §§ 19.2–19.3 (the OSA and the hearing); § 20.1 (record discipline at walk-throughs). Remainder of chapter: reserved.
Chapter 19 holds the law of settlement — and in 2026 it is a chapter in motion. The Gaines en banc decision reset the ground rules of settlement approval: no agreement binds anyone until a judge approves it (§ 19.1); a settlement is a contract and is tested as one (§ 19.2); a judge with adequacy concerns may suspend action and, where information does not come, must build a record by hearing rather than by ultimatum (§ 19.3); adequacy review protects the worker and the public — not the carrier (§ 19.4); the medicals must be filed and may never be withheld (§ 19.5); and a stipulation is not held to substantial-evidence proof (§ 19.6). Readers valuing a settlement should begin at § 19.4; readers responding to an order suspending action should begin at § 19.3.
— [Contributing Editor: this seat is reserved for a California workers’ compensation attorney; specimen text by the compiler, to be replaced and signed by the chapter’s contributing editor]
“[N]o release of liability or compromise agreement is valid unless it is approved by the appeals board or referee.”
(Lab. Code, § 5001, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 17.)
“A tort release is effective upon execution, but a compromise and release of workmen’s compensation liability is invalid until approved… This inquiry by the referee should carry out the legislative objective of ‘protecting workmen who might agree to unfortunate compromises because of economic pressure or lack of competent advice.’ … These safeguards against improvident releases place a workmen’s compensation release upon a higher plane than a private contractual release; it is a judgment, with ‘the same force and effect as an award made after a full hearing.’”
(Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964, 973, quoting Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701, 702, and Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991, 997; as quoted in Gaines, supra; accord Camacho v. Target (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 301–302 [as cited therein], at p. 17.)
“[T]he legal principles governing compromise and release agreements are the same as those governing other contracts.” … “For a compromise and release agreement to be effective, the necessary elements of a contract must exist, including an offer of settlement of a disputed claim by one of the parties, and an acceptance by the other.”
(Burbank Studios v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Yount) (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929, 935, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565, 1580 [as cited therein], at p. 19.)
“A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.”
(County of San Joaquin v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. (Sepulveda) (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 19.)
“[T]he WCJ’s jurisdiction to approve a settlement is only as to those benefits provided by the Labor Code, and a settlement of any claims outside of the Labor Code is not enforceable.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 22.)
“The parties to a controversy may stipulate the facts relative thereto in writing… The appeals board may thereupon make its findings and award based upon such stipulation, or may set the matter down for hearing and take further testimony or make the further investigation necessary to enable it to determine the matter in controversy.”
(Lab. Code, § 5702, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 15.)
“[W]hen the WCJ intends to reject a settlement or requires additional information before approving a settlement, the WCJ must provide adequate due process, which includes notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 15.)
“[A]n evidentiary hearing should be set where the terms of the agreement are unclear, contradictory, include provisions that are outside the Labor Code, the concern over adequacy is significant, and / or the parties fail to provide a sufficient response to the OSA.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 16.)
“The purpose of an award is not to make the employee whole for the loss which he or she has suffered, but to prevent the employee and his or her dependents from becoming public charges during the period of disability.”
(Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 1286, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 18.)
“[T]he WCJ should ensure that payable benefits are not inappropriately shifted onto public systems, for example, Medicare, Medi-Cal, EDD, and Social Security. Adequacy review has the dual purpose of ensuring that an injured worker is appropriately paid benefits, which in turn benefits the public.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 18.)
“If there is information in the record that indicates that an insurance company might be overvaluing a claim, that suggests that the settlement is adequate and that the WCJ should approve the settlement.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 22.)
“When filing a Compromise and Release or a Stipulations with Request for Award, the filing party shall file all agreed medical evaluator reports, qualified medical evaluator reports, treating physician reports, and any other [medical records] that are relevant to a determination of the adequacy… that have not been filed previously.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10700(a), as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 20.)
“Parties may not withhold relevant medical records and / or either intentionally or negligently misrepresent that no such medical records exist.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 20.)
“[The civil-case inquiry] could be appropriate in circumstances where the civil case overlaps with the workers’ compensation case, giving rise to a possible third-party credit… However, the WCJ’s inquiry should be limited in scope to address the issue of adequacy and whether any third-party credit exists or may exist, and it should take place on the record.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 3850 et seq. [seeds Ch. 23], at p. 22.)
“One issue raised by the WCJ in these cases is the misconception that substantial medical evidence is required to determine adequacy of a stipulation. That is not true. Stipulations exist, in part, to obviate the need for evidence.”
(Gaines, supra, citing County of Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121, at p. 21.)
“There is no requirement that substantial medical evidence support a stipulation. The only requirement for adequacy review is that sufficient information exists in the formal record to support a WCJ’s decision on adequacy.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 21.)
“Decisions of the Appeals Board ‘must be based on admitted evidence in the record.’”
(Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 (Appeals Board en banc), as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 15.)
“[D]ecisions of the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274; Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312; LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, at p. 15.)
“An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the WCJ’s decision.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Lab. Code, § 5313; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10787, at p. 15.)
“[O]ther than medical reporting which automatically becomes part of the record of proceedings under WCAB Rule 10803… any other information provided to the WCJ is not part of the record of proceedings and is not admitted as evidence. In particular, WCJs should be mindful that oral statements presented at a walk-through are not part of the court’s record.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 20.)
“All parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions.”
(Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157–158, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 15.)
“Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in regards to the issues.”
(Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 635, fn. 22, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Fortich v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1452–1454 [as cited therein], at p. 15.)
“The appeals board may appoint one or more workers’ compensation administrative law judges in any proceeding, as it may deem necessary or advisable, and may refer, remove to itself, or transfer to a workers’ compensation administrative law judge the proceedings on any claim.”
(Lab. Code, § 5310, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 14.)
“Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5; Kleemann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2, at p. 14.)
“Consolidation may be ordered by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (‘WCAB’) on its own motion[.]”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10396(b), as quoted in Gaines, supra; see § 10396(a) [common issues of fact and law; avoiding inconsistent orders], at p. 15.)
“[W]here no formal record exists, upon receipt of a petition for removal or reconsideration of an OSA, and consistent with WCAB Rules 10955 and 10961, the WCJ may vacate the OSA and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10955(d), 10961, at p. 16.)
“Section 5311 provides that a WCJ may be disqualified upon any one or more of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641.”
(Gaines, supra; Lab. Code, § 5311, at p. 24.)
“Among the grounds for disqualification under section 641 are that the WCJ has ‘formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(f)) or that the WCJ has demonstrated ‘[t]he existence of a state of mind … evincing enmity against or bias toward either party.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(g).)”
(Gaines, supra [disqualification ordered on both grounds], at p. 24.)
“If a defendant believes in good faith that a claim may involve fraud, defendant may take appropriate measures to report suspected fraud. (Cal. Ins. Code, § 1877.3(b).)”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 22.)
“Proceedings before the Appeals Board have no bearing upon subsequent criminal proceedings.”
(Gaines, supra, fn. 11, citing Lab. Code, § 5006, at p. 22.)
“[N]o ‘charge, claim, or agreement for legal services . . . is enforceable, valid, or binding in excess of a reasonable amount. The appeals board may determine what constitutes a reasonable amount.’”
(Lab. Code, § 4906(a), as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 22.)
“Attorneys are prohibited from demanding or accepting a fee until the amount is approved by the Appeals Board.”
(Gaines, supra, citing Vierra v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131, at p. 22.)
“The Legislature has thus spoken clearly and decisively that attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases cannot exceed an amount that is ‘reasonable’ and that the WCAB shall be the final arbiter of reasonableness in all cases.”
(Vierra, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 23.)
“In establishing a reasonable attorney’s fee, the workers’ compensation judge or arbitrator shall consider the: (a) Responsibility assumed by the attorney; (b) Care exercised in representing the applicant; (c) Time involved; and (d) Results obtained.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10844, as quoted in Gaines, supra; see Lab. Code, § 4906(d), at p. 23.)
“When an issue as to the amount of the attorney’s fee arises, the attorney is still entitled to due process to establish the reasonableness of a fee, and any order regarding a disputed fee must be supported by a record. If the C&R is found adequate, but the adequacy of the attorney’s fee remains in question, the WCJ may approve the C&R with the requested attorney’s fee held in trust pending a hearing on the issue.”
(Gaines, supra, at p. 23.)
Generated from the corpus. Every case below appears in this edition only as quoted or cited by the corpus decision. References are to sections.
| Burbank Studios v. WCAB (Yount) (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929 | § 19.2 |
| Camacho v. Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291 | § 19.1 |
| Chavez v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 701 | § 19.1 |
| City of Long Beach v. WCAB (Garcia) (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298 | § 1.1 |
| Cortez v. WCAB (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596 | § 21.8 |
| County of Sacramento v. WCAB (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114 | § 19.6 |
| County of San Joaquin v. WCAB (Sepulveda) (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1180 | § 19.2 |
| Department of Rehabilitation v. WCAB (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281 | § 19.4 |
| Fortich v. WCAB (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1449 | § 20.2 |
| Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (2026) ADJ20216367 et al. (en banc) | passim |
| Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 | § 20.1 |
| Gee v. WCAB (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1418 | § 1.1 |
| Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473 (en banc) | § 20.1 |
| Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 964 | § 19.1 |
| Kleemann v. WCAB (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274 | § 21.8 |
| Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 | § 20.1 |
| LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 | § 20.1 |
| Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991 | § 19.1 |
| Rea v. WCAB (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625 | § 20.2 |
| Rucker v. WCAB (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151 | § 20.2 |
| Vierra v. WCAB (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1128 | § 26.1 |
| Labor Code | |
| § 3850 et seq. | § 19.5 |
| § 4906(a) | § 26.1 |
| § 4906(d) | § 26.1 |
| § 5001 | § 19.1 |
| § 5006 | § 24.6 |
| § 5310 | § 21.8 |
| § 5311 | § 21.10 |
| § 5313 | § 20.1 |
| § 5702 | § 19.3 |
| § 5903 | § 20.1 |
| § 5952(d) | § 20.1 |
| Civil Code | |
| §§ 1550, 1565, 1580 | § 19.2 |
| Code of Civil Procedure | |
| § 641(f), (g) | § 21.10 |
| Government Code | |
| § 11425.60(b) | § 1.1 |
| Insurance Code | |
| § 1877.3(b) | §§ 14.9, 24.6 |
| Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8 | |
| § 10325 | § 1.1 |
| § 10396(a), (b) | § 21.9 |
| § 10421 | § 14.9 |
| § 10700(a) | § 19.5 |
| § 10787 | § 20.1 |
| § 10789(b)(1) | §§ 16.9, 19.5 |
| § 10789(e) | § 16.9 |
| § 10803 | § 20.1 |
| § 10832 | § 16.9 |
| § 10844 | § 26.1 |
| §§ 10955(d), 10961 | § 21.9 |
Adequacy review — purposes of §§ 19.1, 19.4; procedure § 19.3; information bearing on § 19.5; not for carrier’s protection § 14.9
Approval of settlement — required § 19.1; walk-through § 16.9; fees at § 26.6
Attorney’s fees — reasonableness, factors § 26.1; demand or acceptance before approval prohibited § 26.1; disputed, held in trust § 26.6
Bias of judge — disqualification for § 21.10
Consolidation § 21.9
Contract, settlement as § 19.2
Costs, frivolous or bad-faith claim § 14.9
Disqualification of WCJ § 21.10
Due process §§ 19.3, 20.2, 26.6
En banc decisions, weight of § 1.1
Evidence — decisions on admitted record § 20.1; substantial §§ 20.1, 19.6
Fraud — reporting §§ 14.9, 24.6; criminal proceedings distinct § 24.6
Labor Code, settlement of claims outside § 19.2
Medical evaluations — may not be compelled by OSA § 16.9
Medical records — filing with settlement § 19.5; withholding prohibited § 19.5
Order suspending action (OSA) §§ 19.3, 16.9, 21.9
Public interest, adequacy and § 19.4
Record — adequate and complete § 20.1; oral statements at walk-through not part of § 20.1
Removal § 21.8
Stipulations — substantial evidence not required § 19.6; § 5702 § 19.3
Third-party actions, credit § 19.5
Walk-through settlements § 16.9
Corpus of this printing: one decision. Sections populated: seventeen. Holdings of first impression: two, both en banc, both binding. Quotations: forty-two, and two boxed holdings, each machine-verified against the slip opinion of 2026-08-23. Finding aids: a table of twenty-one cases, a table of twenty-six statutes and regulations, and an index — all generated from the corpus. Words of the compiler in the body of this work: none, outside the labeled and signed commentary apparatus.
Every page of this edition was assembled from Gaines v. ABM Aviation, Inc. alone, under the census rule: if it is not in the corpus, it is not in the book. The reserved chapters are not unfinished — they are honest. They will fill, decision by decision, in the courts’ own words, at the speed the corpus grows. This is what a law book looks like when the law is allowed to write it.
the book is the law · corpus: 1 · next: 5,856