“All parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions.”
(Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157–158, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 15.)
“Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in regards to the issues.”
(Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 635, fn. 22, as quoted in Gaines, supra, at p. 15; see Fortich v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1452–1454 [as cited therein].)
“As a matter of due process, all parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions.”
(Perez, supra, at p. 7, citing Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157–158.)
““Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in regards to the issues.””
(Rea v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Milbauer) (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 625, 643, as quoted in Perez, supra, at p. 7.)
“A fair hearing includes, but is not limited to, the opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses; introduce and inspect exhibits; and to offer evidence in rebuttal.”
(Perez, supra, at p. 7, citing Gangwish v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295; Rucker, supra, at pp. 157–158; Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Baskin) (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 54, 58; Katzin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 703, 710.)
“A denial of due process to a party ordinarily compels annulment of the Board’s decision only if it is reasonably probable that, absent the procedural error, the party would have attained a more favorable result. However, if the denial of due process prevents a party from having a fair hearing, the denial of due process is reversible per se.”
(Beverly Hills Multispecialty Group, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pinkney) (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 789, 806, as quoted in Perez, supra, at p. 7.)
“It is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits.”
(Perez, supra, at p. 7, citing Fox, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.)
““when a party in default moves promptly to seek relief, very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court's order setting aside a default.””
(Shamblin, supra, at p. 478, as quoted in Perez, supra, at p. 7.)
“This is particularly true in workers’ compensation cases, where there is a constitutional mandate “to accomplish substantial justice in all cases.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.)”
(Perez, supra, at p. 7.)
““The principal purpose of vesting the court with the discretionary power to correct ‘a mistake in any other respect’ is to enable it to mold and direct its proceedings so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits, when it can be done without injustice to either party, whether the obstruction to such a disposition of cases be a mistake of fact or a mistake as to the law, although it may be that the court should require a stronger showing to justify relief from the effect of a mistake of law than of a mistake of fact.””
(Ward v. Clay (1890) 82 Cal. 502, as quoted in Perez, supra, at p. 8; see Dunzweiler v. Superior Court (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 569, 577.)
← § 20.1 · § 20.3 → · this section in the book