“Statutory analysis begins by examining “the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent … The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.””
(Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818, quoting Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715–716, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 10.)
“When the words of a statute are clear, we must follow their plain meaning.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 10, citing Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)
“If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 10, citing In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 263.)
“The Appeals Board has long held that new interpretations of statute are applied prospectively.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 14.)
“In workers’ compensation cases, it is not uncommon to provide that newly stated judicial rules or newly stated judicial interpretations of statutes shall be applied prospectively only. Such a declaration of prospective application is made primarily to prevent a landslide of reopenings in previously adjudicated workers’ compensation cases, which would burden the workers’ compensation system and result in unfairness to those parties who had relied on a different understanding of law or had accepted a different application of the law; a declaration of prospective application may also be made to harmonize statutory provisions. (Citations.) Although decisions regarding procedural issues are more commonly given prospective effect than are decisions regarding substantive issues (Citation.), decisions affecting an applicant’s substantive right to receive or a defendant’s substantive duty to pay workers’ compensation benefits will be applied prospectively under appropriate circumstances.”
(Farris v. Industrial Wire Products (2000) 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 824, 832–833 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 14.)
“In Farris, we concluded that our decision in that case, on the application of section 5814 penalties to unreasonably delayed section 4650(d) penalties, should be applied prospectively to avoid “an undue burden on the administration of justice in the workers’ compensation system” and the “overwhelming adverse effect on the workers’ compensation system and on the reasonable expectations of the parties participating in it.” (Citation.)”
(Messele v. Pitco Foods, Inc. (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 1318, 1320–1321 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 15.)
Cross-references: § 1.2 (stare decisis); § 9.6 (prospective holdings applied); § 21.2 (the amended § 5909 construed).
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