The Blackletter › Chapter 1 · The System
§ 1.4 Statutory Construction; Prospective Application of New Interpretations
“Statutory analysis begins by examining “the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent … The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.””
(Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818, quoting Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715–716, as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 10.)
“When the words of a statute are clear, we must follow their plain meaning.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 10, citing Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)
“If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 10, citing In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 263.)
“The Appeals Board has long held that new interpretations of statute are applied prospectively.”
(Vazquez, supra, at p. 14.)
“In workers’ compensation cases, it is not uncommon to provide that newly stated judicial rules or newly stated judicial interpretations of statutes shall be applied prospectively only. Such a declaration of prospective application is made primarily to prevent a landslide of reopenings in previously adjudicated workers’ compensation cases, which would burden the workers’ compensation system and result in unfairness to those parties who had relied on a different understanding of law or had accepted a different application of the law; a declaration of prospective application may also be made to harmonize statutory provisions. (Citations.) Although decisions regarding procedural issues are more commonly given prospective effect than are decisions regarding substantive issues (Citation.), decisions affecting an applicant’s substantive right to receive or a defendant’s substantive duty to pay workers’ compensation benefits will be applied prospectively under appropriate circumstances.”
(Farris v. Industrial Wire Products (2000) 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 824, 832–833 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 14.)
“In Farris, we concluded that our decision in that case, on the application of section 5814 penalties to unreasonably delayed section 4650(d) penalties, should be applied prospectively to avoid “an undue burden on the administration of justice in the workers’ compensation system” and the “overwhelming adverse effect on the workers’ compensation system and on the reasonable expectations of the parties participating in it.” (Citation.)”
(Messele v. Pitco Foods, Inc. (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 1318, 1320–1321 (Appeals Bd. en banc), as quoted in Vazquez, supra, at p. 15.)
“A reading that renders part of a regulation superfluous is to be avoided.”
(Dennis, supra, citing Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1048; see Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1207, at p. 15.)
““The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a statute. [Citations.] The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended. [Citations.]””
(Geletko v. Cal. Highway Patrol (2016) 81 Cal.Comp.Cases 661, 667 (panel), citing In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407, as quoted in Dennis, supra, at p. 17.)
“There are also principles of substantial justice and liberality of statutory interpretation that are constitutionally and statutorily prescribed in a workers’ compensation case. (See § 3202.)”
(Dennis, supra, citing Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Lab. Code, § 3202, at p. 14.)
“As with any question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the language of the statute.”
(Maxham v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2017) ADJ3540065, 82 Cal.Comp.Cases 136 (Appeals Bd. en banc), citing Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898–899, at p. 8.)
““Where the same word is used in more than one place in a legislative enactment, we presume the same meaning was intended in each instance.””
(Castro v. Sacramento County Fire Protection Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 927, 932, as quoted in Maxham, supra, at p. 8.)
Cross-references: § 1.2 (stare decisis); § 9.6 (prospective holdings applied); § 21.2 (the amended § 5909 construed); § 15.2 (canons applied).